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I. Introduction 
 
 The law frequently employs a concept of “negligence.”  What does the 
concept mean? 
 This question can be explored from many perspectives.  One perspective 
analyzes different ways of articulating the content of the standard—as a cost-
benefit balance, or a judgment about “community values,” or a version of the 
Golden Rule.  Another, related perspective considers the normative foundations 
of a negligence requirement—as a utilitarian metric of personal fault, as an 
economic rule designed to induce optimal precautions, as a norm of fairness, or 
as a type of fault subject to retributive blame or to a corrective justice duty of 
repair.1 
 In this essay, I take a somewhat different perspective.  What specific 
conceptions of negligence are recognized in the law?  How do these conceptions 
relate to one another?  And why does the law employ these varying conceptions? 
To illustrate some of the distinctions I have in mind, consider the following 
propositions: 
 
(A) Alon, through his dangerous driving, negligently creates an unreasonable 
risk of physical injury to Virgil. 
 
(B) Boris, through his dangerous driving, negligently causes physical injury to 
Virgil. 
 
(C) Claude negligently fails to foresee the risk of physical injury to Virgil. 
 
(D) David negligently drives his car. 
 
(E) Edna, a surgeon, performs an operation during which her hand slips, 
negligently causing physical injury to Virgil. 
 
                                                 
1 For some thoughts on these issues, see Kenneth W. Simons, Negligence, 16 Soc. Phil. 
& Pol. 52 (1999); Kenneth W. Simons, The Hand Formula in the Draft Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Encompassing Fairness As Well as Efficiency Values, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 
901 (2001). 
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(F) Frank has sexual relations with Violet and makes a negligent mistake 
about her age, believing that she is eighteen when she is actually fifteen. 
 
(G) George has sexual relations with Violet and is negligently inadvertent to 
her age: he forms no belief about her age and fails to realize that she is 
actually fifteen. 
 
(H) Harriet, in using deadly force against Vanna, negligently fails to realize 
that Vanna is not threatening Harriet with deadly force. 
 
(I) Irma, in using deadly force against Vanna, lacks any definite beliefs about 
the severity of Vanna’s threat, but negligently fails to control her impulse 
to respond to Vanna’s attack with deadly force. 
 
 Now consider the following questions. 
 
• Is Claude’s failure to foresee the risk of injury sufficient to show that 
he is negligent in the same sense as Alon or Boris? 
• More generally: Are the conceptions of negligent inadvertence (e.g. 
Claude, George) and negligent mistake (e.g., Frank) essentially the 
same as the conception of negligent risk-creation (e.g., Alon, Boris)?  
If not, how do they differ? 
• Is the category of deficient skill (e.g. Edna) an instance of negligent 
risk-creation, or of negligent inadvertence or negligent mistake?  Or is 
it a separate category altogether? 
• Compare David (above) with two new characters—Donna, who 
“knowingly drives her car,” and Delbert, who “purposely drives his 
car.”  Normally, knowledge and purpose are considered more serious 
forms of culpability than negligence.  Yet David is conclusively at fault, 
while Donna and Delbert are not.  What explains this paradox? 
• Is negligent lack of self-control (e.g. Irma) a coherent form of 
negligence? 
 
 In this essay, I will explore these questions, and others, concerning 
different dimensions or categories of negligence.  The next section of the essay 
analyzes the standard tort conception of negligence as unreasonably risky 
conduct.  The following section evaluates the modern criminal law conception of 
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negligence as negligent inadvertence or negligent mistake.  Subsequent sections 
compare the tort conduct conception and the criminal law cognitive conception, 
and also introduce other varieties of negligence.  Then, stepping back from these 
conceptions, I examine carefully five different functions that a legal negligence 
standard might serve.  A conclusion identifies some misconceptions that the 
analysis refutes, and offers some final conjectures about whether, and how, 
different views of the content and normative underpinnings of negligence would 
affect the analysis. 
 I believe that the comparative treatment of different conceptions of 
negligence can be quite illuminating, especially to scholars and judges familiar 
with tort doctrine but unfamiliar with criminal law, and vice versa.  But the proof is 
in the pudding… 
II. The standard tort conception of negligence: unreasonably risky 
conduct 
 
 Let us begin with what might be called the “standard” conception of 
negligence employed in tort law.  Under this conception, negligence consists in 
creating an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, a risk that the actor 
could and should have prevented by taking a precaution.  The actor is 
considered to be at fault for not taking the precaution, although his fault is 
understood to be less serious than the fault of an actor who creates the risk of 
harm intending that the harm occur or believing that that harm is likely.2 
                                                 
2 See Draft Restatement (Third) of the Law, Torts: Liability for Physical Harm, Tent. Draft 
No. 1 (March 28, 2001), §1, comments a, d [hereinafter, Draft Restatement (Third) of 
Torts].  The “intentional” or “knowing” actor would be liable for a battery.  Although 
damages for intentional torts and for torts of negligence are usually the same, the 
character of a tort as intentional rather than negligent makes punitive damages more 
readily available, often lessens the effect of victim fault under comparative fault 
principles, and might relax the rules of proximate cause.  Id., §5, comment a. 
However, we will see that the tort culpability hierarchy is more complex than the 
text implies, for a battery does not require intent to cause harm.  See text at notes 113-
117= infra. 
Page 4 of 57 Simons, Dimensions of Negligence  8/7/02 
 On the standard conception, the primary fault underlying a negligence 
claim is the actor’s failure to take a reasonable precaution against the risk of 
harm.  To be sure, tort law demands compensation for negligently-caused harm, 
and normally does not provide a remedy for negligence unless the negligence 
results in harm.  Still, it is the negligent act that determines the actor’s fault.  In 
other words, the state of affairs in which the negligent act does not occur is 
clearly preferable to that in which the actor negligently causes harm but pays 
compensation.3 
 The determination that an actor is negligent is made from an ex ante 
perspective, considering the foreseeable risks from the actor’s conduct and the 
foreseeable benefits (in the form of risk-reduction) from the actor’s taking a 
precaution.  Negligence depends on foresight, not hindsight; on the reasonably 
apparent state of the world at the time of the action at issue, not on the actual 
state of the world at that time.  Moreover, although negligence necessarily 
involves risk-creation,4 negligence might or might not cause harm. 
 The standard conception treats negligence as an evaluative criterion, and 
as a conclusive judgment of fault.  If an actor is negligent, then he should have 
acted differently.  By creating an “unreasonable” risk of harm, or failing to take a 
“reasonable” precaution against harm, he is necessarily unjustified in acting as 
he did.  And if harm follows, he will be liable in damages.  By contrast, 
“knowingly” or “intentionally” creating a risk of harm, even a very high risk of 
harm, need not be an unjustified act.  (Intentionally or knowingly harming a 
person can be justified by self-defense, for example.)  Put differently, lack of 
                                                 
3 See Simons, The Hand Formula, supra note 1=, at 905.  Accordingly, negligence liability 
(even in tort law) is best understood as a property rule, not a liability rule, insofar as the 
tortfeasor is not deemed entitled to cause harm so long as he pays.  See Guido Calabresi 
& A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of 
the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972).  Similarly, tort liability for negligence is 
better viewed as a sanction, not a price.  Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1523, 1538 (1984). 
4 A qualification: actors are sometimes liable for negligent omissions even when they 
have not created the risk of harm.  (Consider parents’ duties with respect to their 
children’s health and safety.)  In such cases, the actor has a duty to use reasonable care 
to reduce the risk of harm. 
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justification is built into the very concept of negligence; but it is not part of the 
concept of knowingly or intentionally harming another. 
In principle, one could break down the analysis of unjustifiable risk-
creation into two issues—(1) the significance of the risk created; and (2) the 
justifiability of creating that risk (which we might also characterize as the burden 
of taking a precaution against that risk).  The law could then explicitly develop a 
range of standards: creating a trivial risk of a trivial harm requires only a slight 
justification; creating a more significant risk of a trivial harm requires a more 
weighty justification; creating a significant risk of a more significant harm requires 
an even more weighty justification; and so forth.  But the tort conception of 
negligence instead ordinarily employs a single standard, with a sliding scale: the 
justification for imposing a risk must ordinarily be weightier as the probability and 
severity of the harm risked increases.5  Only when the significance of the risk 
reaches a relatively high level, and the actor is aware of a relatively high level of 
risk or intends to cause harm, does the “sliding-scale” negligence test give way to 
the qualitatively different standards for reckless and intentional torts.6 
III.  The modern criminal law conception of negligence: unreasonable 
inadvertence and unreasonable mistake 
 
Although the standard tort conception understands negligence as 
unreasonably unsafe conduct, modern criminal law emphasizes a different, 
cognitive conception of negligence—namely, the actor’s unreasonable 
inadvertence or unreasonable mistake.  Criminal law employs other conceptions 
of negligence as well, but it will prove useful to characterize this cognitive 
conception as “the” modern criminal law conception before introducing further 
complexity.7 
                                                 
5 See Simons, Negligence, supra note 1=, at 56-57; Dan Dobbs, The Law of Torts §§26, 
27 (2000). 
6 See Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts, supra note 2=, §§1, 2. 
7 I describe this as the “modern” criminal law conception because the influential Model 
Penal Code emphasizes this conception.  Traditional criminal law doctrine, by contrast, 
does not employ or emphasize any single conception of negligence.  Instead, it contains 
a variety of doctrines that could be broadly classified as involving negligence—including 
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Cognitive negligence, or negligence in relation to beliefs, has two basic 
forms.  An actor might be unreasonably ignorant or inadvertent in failing to form 
any belief about a relevant matter, when he should have formed a belief.  
(Consider George above.8)  Or the actor might form a definite belief, but that 
belief might be unreasonably mistaken. (Consider Frank, above.)  I will use the 
term “cognitive negligence” for both negligent inadvertence (when the actor 
unreasonably fails to advert to a risk or to an existing fact) and negligent mistake 
(when the actor forms the unreasonable and incorrect belief that the risk or fact 
does not exist).  In either case, the actor is negligent for not forming a belief that 
he reasonably should have formed.9 
The highly influential Model Penal Code emphasizes a cognitive 
conception of negligence.10  Under the Code, negligence is the least “culpable” 
category of four “culpability” terms.  In order of increasing “culpability,” with 
higher punishment potentially warranted for each increment, the categories are 
negligence, recklessness, knowledge, and purpose.  In essence, a negligent 
                                                                                                                                                 
general intent, mistake of fact, the mens rea for manslaughter, and objective 
requirements of self-defense. 
8 Or consider Claude: suppose he switched lanes on a highway without considering the 
possibility that someone was in his blind spot, and thus without realizing that his action 
posed a substantial risk of harm. 
9 ”Inadvertence” and “mistake” are two basic categories of cognitive deficiency, i.e., of the 
actor failing to form a belief that he should have formed.  But other categories also exist, 
such as agnosticism.  See Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. Rev. 463, 540 
(1992). 
10 The Israeli Criminal Code appears to be similar in this respect:  
Negligence means unawareness of the nature of the act, of the existence of the 
circumstances or of the possibility of consequences of the act being brought 
about, such nature, circumstances and consequences being ingredients of the 
offence, when a reasonable person could, in the circumstances of the case, have 
been aware of it … 
 
Israeli Penal Code §21(a) (1995) (unauthorized English translation), reported at 30 Israel 
L. Rev. 1, 14 (1996).  However, a proviso to this section acknowledges a “conduct 
negligence” requirement as well: 
Provided that – … (b) the possibility of the consequences being brought is not a 
reasonable risk. 
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actor is one who should be aware of an unjustifiable risk11; the reckless actor is 
aware of an unjustifiable risk but nevertheless takes it; the knowing actor is 
aware that a harmful result is practically certain to occur, or that an incriminating 
circumstance very probably exists; and the purposeful actor has the conscious 
object of achieving the result.12 
 Why does the Code largely employ a cognitive conception of negligence?  
For two basic reasons.  First, the Code drafters wanted to ensure that some form 
of “conscious” wrongdoing would normally be required for criminal liability.  
Doctrinally, they accomplished this by providing that “recklessness,” rather than 
“negligence,” is the presumptive minimum culpability term for every material 
element of every crime.13  Accordingly, recklessness is defined (in part) as 
awareness that a harm may ensue or that an incriminating circumstance might 
obtain.14  At the same time, negligence is understood negatively, as a form of 
culpability in which the actor lacks such awareness.  (Indeed, the only difference 
between negligence and recklessness under the Code is this difference in 
awareness.15)  Second, the drafters wanted negligence to fit within a structured 
                                                 
11 Model Penal Code §2.02(2)(d) (ALI 1985) (hereinafter “MPC”).  Importantly, however, 
the MPC defines criminal negligence as a gross deviation from reasonable conduct; thus, 
criminal negligence is a species of what tort law would call “gross” negligence, not 
ordinary negligence.  Also, MPC negligence presupposes that the actor should have 
been aware of a “substantial” risk of harm.  I put aside, for purposes of this article, the 
interesting question whether this substantiality requirement (common to the MPC 
definitions of both negligence and recklessness) should be understand as an 
independent requirement, or instead as just an aspect of unjustifiability.  See Larry 
Alexander, Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability, 88 Cal. L. 
Rev. 931, 933-935 (2000).  
12 MPC, §2.02(2).  Note two qualifications.  First, the meaning of these culpability terms 
differs somewhat when they pertain to a circumstance element of an offense, rather than 
a result element.  Second, the MPC strongly disfavors strict criminal liability, or liability in 
the absence of any form of culpability.  MPC §2.05. 
13 MPC, §2.02(3). 
14 Specifically, MPC “recklessness” requires that the actor be aware of a substantial risk 
of a relevant harm occurring or circumstance existing.  MPC, §2.02(2)(c). 
15 It need not have been so.  Criminal recklessness could be distinguished from criminal 
negligence not according to consciousness of risk, but according to the actor’s greater 
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hierarchy of mental states or culpability terms, under which “higher” forms of 
culpability within the hierarchy correspond to more serious crimes.  (As we will 
later see, however, the cognitive conception only imperfectly achieves either of 
these objectives.) 
One straightforward example of the role of the cognitive conception in the 
Code hierarchy is the law of homicide.  Purposely or knowingly causing a death 
is murder, the most serious form of homicide; recklessly causing a death is 
manslaughter; and negligently causing a death is negligent homicide, the least 
serious form of homicide.16  Thus, if an actor causes death and is grossly 
negligent in lacking awareness of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death, he 
has committed negligent homicide. 
Similarly, consistent with the Code hierarchy, a legislature could 
differentiate three different degrees of rape according to the actor’s culpability 
with respect to the critical circumstance element, the victim’s nonconsent.  A 
defendant who had sexual intercourse with the victim knowing that she did not 
consent might, for example, be guilty of first degree rape; a defendant who was 
reckless as to her nonconsent might be guilty of second degree rape; and a 
defendant who was negligent as to her nonconsent might be guilty of a third 
degree.  Thus, an actor’s beliefs can be ordered in a hierarchy both when the 
                                                                                                                                                 
indifference to risk or her more seriously culpable reasons for creating an unjustifiable 
risk.  (One example of the latter approach is the usual doctrinal presumption, even in the 
MPC, that an intoxicated actor is legally “reckless” even if he is in fact unaware of the 
relevant risk is an example of such a distinction.)  Similarly, it is plausible to treat an actor 
as “reckless” if she is actually aware of a very slight risk and should have inferred that the 
risk was substantial; but the Code apparently would treat such an actor as only negligent, 
since she lacks actual awareness of a substantial risk.  Insofar as non-Code criminal law 
doctrine distinguishes recklessness from negligence, it sometimes uses a criterion other 
than awareness of a substantial risk.  See Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law 
§10.04[D][3] (3d. ed., LEXIS 2001) (formerly recklessness was on a continuum, together 
with criminal negligence and civil negligence, based on degree of risk); id., §10.07[B][3] 
(MPC influenced transformation of recklessness-negligence distinction from degree of 
risk to awareness); Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law §3.7 n. 6 (3rd ed., West 2000) 
(recklessness has been distinguished from negligence variously by degree of risk, 
awareness of risk, or both). 
16 MPC §§210.2, 210.3, 210.4. 
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beliefs pertain to a result of the actor’s conduct (as in homicide) and also when 
they pertain to an attendant circumstance (as in this rape example).17 
IV. Comparing the standard tort and modern criminal law conceptions 
 
It is illuminating to compare the tort and criminal law conceptions.  In 
several important respects, the conceptions are similar: 
(1)  Both employ an evaluative rather than descriptive criterion: they ask a 
normative question (what the actor should have done or should have believed), 
not a factual one (what he actually did, or actually intended, or actually 
believed).18  In this sense, at least, both conceptions are “objective” rather than 
“subjective.”19  By contrast, “knowledge” and “intention” criteria are descriptive.20 
(2)  Both employ “reasonableness” or “the reasonable person” as the 
evaluative criterion.21   
(3)  The evaluation is a conclusive judgment of fault, in the relevant 
sense.  Negligent conduct is unjustified conduct, or conduct that should, all things 
considered, have been otherwise.  Negligent ignorance and negligent mistake, 
                                                 
17 Few MPC crimes fully exploit the culpability hierarchy, especially with respect to 
circumstance elements.  See Douglas Husak, The Sequential Principle of Relative 
Culpability, 1 Legal Theory 493, 503-505 (1995). 
18 For grading purposes, to be sure, the cognitive conception also asks a factual 
question: Was the actor aware of the risk?  If so, he is reckless; if not, he is only 
negligent. 
19 For further discussion of the different senses of “subjective” and “objective” in 
connection with negligence, see George P. Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law 
117-120 (Oxford 1998); see also George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 504-514 
(Little, Brown & Co. 1978). 
20 Of course, a normative rationale ultimately explains why and when the law employs 
such descriptive criteria.  But the actual application of the criterion by the factfinder does 
not explicitly require normative judgment.  (To be sure, this is a matter of degree; a juror 
familiar with the consequence of a determination that the actor “intended” to kill will 
undoubtedly use her moral judgment, and not just the judge’s instructions defining 
“intent,” in making that determination.) 
21 However, the “reasonable person” formulation is not a necessary feature of a 
negligence standard.  See text at notes 69-85= infra. 
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similarly, are unjustified: all things considered, the actor should have formed a 
particular belief, or should not have formed the belief that he did form.  
(4)  Both conceptions employ the idea of risk, chance or probability.22  
The tort conception considers whether the actor created an unreasonable risk of 
future harm, while the criminal law conception considers whether he 
unreasonably lacked a belief, as to either a relevant probability of a future harm 
occurring (e.g., Claude failing to foresee a significant risk of death) or the 
relevant probability of an existing fact (e.g. George failing to appreciate a 
significant chance that the victim was underage). 
(5)  Lastly—and related to the last point—both conceptions permit a 
distinction between a risk or possibility of a harm or fact, and that harm occurring 
or that fact existing.  One can negligently create a risk of harm, and yet not cause 
harm.  And one can negligently fail to form the belief that a fact exists or that a 
result will occur, even though the fact actually does not exist, or the result 
actually does not occur.23  (This conceptual separation permits liability for 
inchoate torts or crimes, an implication explored below.24) 
                                                 
22 I include “or probability” because the notion of “risk” implies an unwanted or adverse 
outcome.  See Holly Smith, “Risk,” Encyclopedia of Ethics 1109 (L. Becker and C. Becker 
eds. 1992).  Accordingly, “risk” is a less apt term for describing beliefs as to existing 
circumstances, such as the age of a victim or the status of an assault victim as a police 
officer.  One can negligently create a “risk” of killing someone, but it might be more 
precise to say that one is negligently unaware of the “possibility” or “probability” that a 
victim is under the age of eighteen or is a police officer.  On the other hand, perhaps 
even a circumstance element is an “adverse outcome” in the following sense.  Although, 
by definition, a circumstance cannot be changed by the actor, the actor’s actual 
satisfaction of such an element makes his conduct criminal, and thus the actor should 
treat such satisfaction as unwelcome.  (The MPC, in defining recklessness and 
negligence, employs the term “risk” for both result and circumstance elements.  MPC 
§2.02(2)(c),(d).)  
23 Thus, the following might both be true: (a) George is unreasonable in failing to arrive at 
the belief that the victim is underage; but (b) the victim is not underage.  (Suppose she 
has an unusually immature appearance, and he meets her at a junior high school dance.) 
By the same token, one can be unreasonable in forming the affirmative and 
exculpatory belief that a fact exists or that a harm will not occur, yet the exculpatory fact 
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But the tort and criminal law conceptions also differ in some fundamental 
ways: 
(1)  The tort conception focuses on deficient conduct and on the need to 
take a precaution against risks of future harm.   The criminal law conception 
focuses on deficient beliefs, not deficient precaution: one can negligently fail to 
believe something without necessarily failing to take a reasonable preventive 
measure.25  Thus, in one sense, the tort conception is wider: it includes both 
cases where the actor was unreasonably unaware of the relevant risks and 
cases where the actor was fully aware of those risks.26 
(2)  The tort conception provides a pervasive standard for behavior 
subject to legal liability, for it broadly encompasses any act that negligently 
causes physical harm to person or property.  The criminal law conception is 
interstitial and derivative: it is but one culpability term among many, and its 
                                                                                                                                                 
might actually exist or the harm might actually not occur.  (Consider Frank, who is 
negligent in believing that the victim is above age; and again, suppose she actually is.) 
24 See text at notes 101-103= infra. 
25 Put differently, a precaution is conduct that would effectively prevent a risk from 
reaching fruition.  In the case of negligent beliefs, often the only relevant default is the 
actor’s failure to reasonably assess the significance of the information she already 
possesses.  Characterizing that default as failure to take a “precaution” is a forced 
locution at best.  Of course, in some cases a faulty belief does indeed consist in a failure 
to take a “precaution” in the ordinary sense of the term.  If Ford Motor Company 
negligently failed to realize that the location of the fuel tank on the Ford Pinto was 
dangerous, this default might have been a consequence of failing adequately to research 
in advance the possible safety hazards from that design.  In other cases, too, the actor 
might fail to “give careful attention” to the results of his conduct; and paying close 
attention (for example, while driving) is indeed a kind of precaution.  Nevertheless, if I am 
paying adequate attention and have no opportunity (or no duty) to conduct a further 
investigation, my failure to make a reasonable inference from facts at my disposal can be 
a negligent mistake without entailing that I have failed to take a reasonable “precaution.” 
26 Tort law does employ a concept of recklessness, but it is significantly different, and 
usually narrower, than modern criminal law’s conception of recklessness.  The latter 
conception is simply negligence plus advertence to risk, while the former also might 
require both indifference to risk and a greater departure from the standard of care than 
negligence requires.  See Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts, supra note 2=, §2. 
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significance depends on the substantive criminal law norm to which it attaches 
(homicide, assault, property interests, sexual autonomy, public morals, the 
administration of justice, and so forth).27  Negligence in failing to determine 
whether a victim consents to sexual intercourse has a rather different moral 
significance than negligence in judging the value of property one is stealing, and 
the consequences for criminal punishment are correspondingly quite different.28 
(3)  The tort conception endorses an ex ante perspective, while the 
criminal law conception, strictly speaking, does not.  That is, in tort law the issue 
is whether the actor’s conduct was reasonable in light of the risks it created ex 
ante, prior to their fruition (or nonfruition) in harm.  The criminal law conception 
instead asks whether the actor’s belief was reasonable, in light of the information 
available to him when he formed the belief.  Negligent inadvertence or mistake 
need not entail that the actor created (or failed to minimize) an unreasonable risk 
of future harm; it need only mean that he lacked adequate grounds for his belief.  
To put the matter differently:  Although a belief can be reasonable or 
unreasonable, and thus can be non-negligent or negligent, the object of such a 
belief can be a proposition about the future, about the present, or even about the 
past.29  So the ex ante perspective is not a necessary part of the cognitive 
negligence determination. 
                                                 
27 This contrast should not be overstated, however: a pervasive tort negligence standard 
applies only to physical injury to person or property, not to exclusively economic or 
emotional harms. 
28 For further discussion of this point, see text at notes 36-37= infra. 
29 This point is most obvious when the belief pertains to an existing fact.  If Frank’s belief 
as to Violet’s current age is negligent, this does not entail that, ex ante, he is taking an 
unreasonable risk of some future consequence that may or may not come to fruition.  But 
even when the relevant belief pertains to a risk of future harm, the reasonableness of the 
belief itself is not evaluated “ex ante” in the relevant sense.  Thus, if Claude negligently 
failed to appreciate that the dangerous maneuver he was about to undertake would 
create a significant risk of death, his cognitive fault consists in his unreasonable failure of 
perception or inference, based on information reasonably available at the time that he 
formed his belief.  (His conduct fault, however, does consist in his creating an ex ante 
unreasonable risk of future harm.) 
Insofar as the law makes relevant the reasonableness of an actor’s beliefs about 
past facts, clearly the reasonableness analysis does not involve an “ex ante” evaluation.  
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V. A more complete picture of negligence in tort and criminal law 
 
At this point, an impatient reader might wonder: Am I exaggerating the 
differences between the conduct and cognitive conceptions?  Indeed, am I 
unnecessarily multiplying conceptions of negligence, ignoring the fundamental 
and core similarities?  Would Ockham’s razor come in handy? 
Consider the following (superficially) attractive reasons to cut down the 
complexity of the analysis.  First, in criminal law, often the cognitive negligence 
standard is employed, not alone, but in conjunction with a tort-like conception of 
negligent conduct.  Second, the very meaning of cognitive “negligence” depends 
on the legal context; what counts as culpable inadvertence depends on the 
nature of the conduct that the actor should have realized he was engaging in, or 
the nature of the harm he should have realized he was risking.  Third, because 
the tort conception incorporates the idea of ex ante risk, it seems to presuppose 
a certain kind of cognitive inquiry—the inquiry into whether the risk is “reasonably 
foreseeable.” 
Each of these points merits more careful attention, for each is valid.  In 
the end, however, none of them undermines the importance of the fundamental 
distinction between cognitive and conduct negligence.  Indeed, I must regretfully 
report a further conclusion: an even greater profusion of conceptions of 
negligence proves useful. 
 
A.   When criminal law employs a conduct conception of negligence 
 
 Consider first whether the cognitive conception is the only important 
conception of negligence employed in criminal law doctrine.  Closer examination 
reveals that it is not.  Rather, criminal law negligence standards often employ the 
cognitive conception in conjunction with a tort-like conception of unreasonable, 
ex ante unjustifiable, risk-creation.  Reconsider negligent homicide liability.  Such 
liability requires more than that an actor was cognitively negligent, i.e., that he 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Consider the requirement that a police officer have reasonable grounds to believe that 
the defendant has committed a crime before arresting the defendant.) 
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should have realized that he was posing a risk (even a substantial risk) of death 
to another.  Medical operations, for example, often pose such risks.  In addition, 
the risk posed (and the failure to take a precaution against the risk) must itself be 
unjustifiable. 
 A more careful analysis of the Model Penal Code definition of negligence 
reveals that it often encompasses these two different aspects of negligence.  As 
explained above, the Code defines a category of unreasonably inadvertent actors 
(and contrasts them to advertent, “reckless”30 actors).  But it also implicitly 
establishes a standard of care with respect to the actor’s conduct.  A negligent 
actor is one who “should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable” risk 
(emphasis added).31  Thus, a negligent actor both (a) creates a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk [of death, in the case of homicide], and (b) unreasonably lacks 
awareness of that risk.32  Notice that (a) suggests a tort-like conception of 
unreasonable care, while (b) is a cognitive conception of unreasonable 
inadvertence.33 
To be more precise, this conduct-plus-cognitive definition applies when 
negligence is the “culpability” term applicable to a result element of a crime (such 
as the causation of death in the crime of homicide, or the destruction of a building 
                                                 
30 However, recklessness has other important meanings besides advertence.  It can also 
refer to culpable indifference, or to gross negligence.  See Kenneth W. Simons, 
Culpability and Retributive Theory: The Problem of Criminal Negligence, 5 J. Contemp. L. 
Issues 365, 372 (1994); Simons, Rethinking Mental States, supra note 9=, at 482-490.  
For simplicity, in this paper I use the term only in the Model Penal Code sense. 
31 MPC §2.02(2)(d). 
32 The Code also provides that “[t]he risk must be of such a nature and degree that the 
actor’s failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the 
circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a 
reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation.”  MPC §2.02(2)(d) (emphasis 
added).  This language underscores the cognitive orientation of the MPC definition.  
Notice the focus on the unreasonableness of the inadvertence, not on the 
unreasonableness (in the sense of unjustifiability) of the risk. 
33 The commentary to MPC §2.02 explicitly distinguishes these two aspects of 
negligence.  See MPC §2.02 commentary at 241 (ALI 1985). 
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in the crime of arson).34  However, a purely cognitive conception necessarily 
applies when negligence pertains to a circumstance element of a crime (such as 
a victim’s nonconsent or age in a sexual assault crime).  After all, an actor cannot 
create an unjustifiable risk that a victim of sexual assault is under age; by 
definition, a “circumstance” element is  a legally relevant state of affairs over 
which the actor lacks control.35  Thus, if rape requires that the actor be negligent 
as to the victim’s nonconsent, then the actor’s negligence consists solely in his 
unreasonably lacking awareness of the risk (category (b), above), not in his 
creating a substantial and unjustifiable risk of some harm (category (a), above). 
It is true, then, that the criminal law often (though not always) employs a 
conduct conception of negligence together with the cognitive conception.  But 
this hardly shows that the conceptions are identical.  Indeed, it might be 
preferable if the conceptions were disaggregated, to clarify that in a result crime 
such as negligent homicide, the prosecution should prove both forms of 
negligence. 
                                                 
34 The conduct-plus-cognitive definition also applies when Model Penal Code 
“recklessness” applies to a result element, because the MPC definitions of recklessness 
and negligence contain the same requirement of unjustifiable risk-creation.  Thus, 
reckless manslaughter (reckless causation of death) requires proof both of awareness of 
a substantial risk of death, and of unjustifiable creation of a substantial risk of death. 
35 In this regard, it contrasts with “result” elements, which (again by definition) the actor 
does have power to bring about.  See Paul Robinson, Structure and Function in Criminal 
Law 26 (1997); Simons, Rethinking Mental States, supra note 9=, at 535-537. 
 A related point: the cognitive-plus-conduct negligence definition is a doubly 
evaluative standard, directly applied by the trier of fact.  (In negligent homicide, for 
example, the jury decides both whether the actor should have been aware of the risk, and 
whether he created an unjustified risk.)  By contrast, when a purely cognitive negligence 
definition is coupled with other conduct requirements, the trier of fact’s evaluative rule is 
much more limited, for those conduct requirements reflect a conclusive culpability 
judgment that the legislature has already made.  (In so-called “negligent rape,” the jury 
decides whether the actor should have been aware that the victim was consenting, but 
not whether force or penetration should be required for rape.  The latter is a legislative 
judgment, precluding the actor from raising the claim that it is justifiable to engage in 
nonconsensual forcible intercourse with another (apart from narrow criminal law 
defenses). 
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Let us turn to the second issue noted above, the issue of contextuality.  A 
closer look at the conception of “negligent” inadvertence reveals that its very 
meaning depends on the other elements of the crime or tort with which it is 
associated.  This contextual dependence illustrates that the distinction between 
“cognitive” and “conduct” negligence is somewhat overdrawn. 
In one obvious sense, the evaluative judgment that a cognitive negligence 
standard demands is distinct from the judgment that a conduct negligence 
standard demands: the question is what, all things considered, the actor should 
have believed, rather than what he should have done.  But this way of putting it 
conceals an important connection between the two evaluations.  The point of the 
cognitive evaluation is not simply to determine what the actor “should have 
believed” in the abstract.  Rather, whether the actor is at fault in failing to arrive at 
a particular belief, and how seriously he is at fault, depends on the larger 
normative context, and indeed is subsidiary to a broader normative judgment.  
Whether the actor “should” have realized that another person was less than age 
sixteen depends, for example, on whether he is charged with selling cigarettes to 
a minor, with employing an underage person, or with statutory rape.  If one of 
these crimes is punished much more harshly than the others, the actor is under a 
more stringent duty to determine the age of the victim and thus avoid the risk of 
violating the prohibition.36  The social context of the interaction is also significant: 
a request to see identification cards is more reasonable to expect in a business 
setting (e.g. a sale in a liquor store) than in the setting of a consensual social 
date that has progressed to the point of sexual intimacy.  At the extreme, the 
moral fault of making a mistake about another’s age can be quite trivial, if the 
context is a purely social one in which the risk of criminal conduct appears to be 
insignificant.  Thus, suppose an absent-minded professor asks how a friend’s 
daughter is enjoying high school, when it should be obvious that she is still in 
grade school.  Since the only issue here is the moral rather than legal duty to use 
reasonable care to avoid embarrassing another, the professor’s cognitive 
negligence reflects a weak form of fault.37 
                                                 
36 See Kenneth W. Simons, When is Strict Criminal Liability Just?, 87 J. Crim. L. & 
Criminol. 1075, 1093, 1123-24 (1997). 
37 Indeed, a variation of the cognitive negligence standard applies even outside of the 
context of fault liability.  Notice that a “reasonable foresight of risks” criterion can be part 
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Indeed, because of its context-dependence, a cognitive negligence 
evaluation sometimes will consider ex ante risks in at least a limited way, 
notwithstanding the discussion earlier.  For a determination that the actor was 
“negligently” inadvertent should consider the ex ante risks that the negligent 
mistake or ignorance will contribute to unjustified conduct or an unjustified harm.  
A passenger who pays no attention to the condition of the brakes of the car in 
which he has been travelling is not negligent, for he has no reason to believe that 
he will need to drive and that such information about risks could be relevant to 
his planned behavior.  If the driver suddenly faints and the passenger must take 
over, his prior inadvertence to the poor condition of the brakes is hardly 
negligent.  The original driver, by contrast, acts unreasonably if he does not take 
an appropriate precaution as soon as he discovers or should discover the 
condition. 
We can see, then, that the criminal law conception of negligence is often 
employed in conjunction with the tort conception, and that the cognitive 
conception ultimately has normative significance only in the context of the actor’s 
overall conduct, as defined by all material elements of the crime or tort.  Neither 
point, however, denies that the conduct and cognitive conceptions are 
fundamentally distinct.  For those conceptions still express very different 
                                                                                                                                                 
of a strict liability standard, with respect to the scope of the risks as to which strict liability 
is imposed or the proximate cause limitations of liability for harm factually caused by the 
relevant activity. See Dobbs, supra note 5=, §346, p. 951 (The Rylands v. Fletcher rule is 
based on the idea that “a person who introduces something to the land that is not 
naturally there and likely to do mischief if it escapes must be held strictly liable for 
foreseeable harms resulting if it does in fact escape.”); id. at §349, pp. 959-60 
(“[D]efendant's strict liability activities must at least be a proximate or legal cause of that 
harm… For example, if the defendant's dog has a known propensity to bite house guests, 
the defendant will be strictly liable for the dog's bites, but not strictly liable when the dog 
merely gets in the plaintiff's way and causes a fall.”)  
On the other hand, in this context it does not appear that the reasonableness or 
unreasonableness of the actor’s foresight of risk is really a judgment of fault.  Rather than 
expressing a judgment that the strictly liable actor is at fault for not accurately perceiving 
the scope of the risks he creates, “reasonable foresight” might operate as an appropriate 
limitation on the extent of strict liability in the interests of a fair (or economically optimal) 
allocation of financial responsibility between a nonfaulty injurer and a nonfaulty victim. 
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inquiries—whether the actor should have done something different, rather than 
whether he should have believed otherwise.  To be sure, whether one “should” 
have believed otherwise is dependent on the context, including the acts that one 
should not have taken.  Still, the ultimate criterion of the seriousness of a crime 
(and, sometimes, of a tort) depends on all of the elements of the crime, and on all 
of the actor’s relevant beliefs and motives, not just the unreasonableness of the 
actor’s beliefs as to a particular element.  For example, in assessing the 
seriousness of the crime of rape, one should not focus exclusively and narrowly 
on how unreasonable the actor is in believing that the victim is consenting; for it 
is also highly relevant whether the actor recognizes that she might not be 
consenting, or knows that he is using force or a threat of force. 
B. When tort law employs a cognitive conception of negligence 
 
The third issue identified above is whether the tort conception of 
negligence can do without a cognitive conception of negligence.  Can we really 
make any sense of unreasonably dangerous conduct without any reference to 
what the actor should have believed? 
In many tort negligent cases, the judgment that the actor’s conduct was 
deficient does rest in part on the actor’s cognitive deficiency.  Often, the 
judgment that a dangerous driver’s creation of risk of harm was unreasonable 
depends in part on his unreasonable failure to foresee the risks of his conduct, 
either through negligent inadvertence or negligent mistake.  One who fails to 
observe carefully whether pedestrians are nearby can be negligent because 
careful observation would have enabled him to avoid creating an unreasonable 
risk of harm. 
Of course, in many standard negligence cases, the actor is quite aware of 
the relevant risks.  In these cases, negligence often takes the form of an 
unreasonable decision to encounter the risks, a decision reflecting a socially 
unreasonable weighing of the risks and benefits of one’s conduct.  The actor can 
be unreasonable in assessing the probability of the risk: he realizes that 
pedestrians are in the vicinity but believes he has extraordinary driving skills that 
will permit him to avoid hitting them.  Or he can be unreasonable in overvaluing 
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the social importance of pursuing his own ends, or in undervaluing the 
seriousness of the harms that he might inflict. 
More fundamentally, the ex ante perspective that is normally a necessary 
feature of the tort negligence judgment itself presupposes a certain kind of 
“cognitive” judgment, quite apart from whether the actor is subjectively aware of 
the relevant risks.  For an ex ante analysis requires that we characterize the 
relevant risks, and this in turn requires an epistemic judgment.  That is, a 
negligent actor is one who creates an unreasonable risk that she could have 
prevented by a reasonable precaution.  But the reasonableness of the risk and of 
the corresponding precaution are ordinarily judged ex ante.38  One cannot 
conclude that an actor took an unreasonable risk of future harm without some 
framework for identifying what risks she should have identified in advance.  “On a 
clear day,” the saying goes, “you can foresee forever.”  The question is not 
whether, in hindsight, we now know that the actor should not have taken the risk, 
in light of the harms and benefits that followed.  Rather, the question is what 
precaution the actor should have taken, in light of the risks that, at the time of her 
action, she “should” (in some sense to be defended) have realized she was 
creating.39 
Thus, the tort conception presupposes an idealized epistemic perspective 
with respect to the expected likelihood and nature of the risks posed by the 
                                                 
38 This is not true, however, in cases of deficient skill.  See text at notes 42-44=. 
39 From a nonepistemic perspective, the probability of a harmful result can be viewed as 
either 1 or 0.  It either will or will not occur.  See Larry Alexander, Foreward: Coleman 
and Corrective Justice, 15 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. 621, 634-635 (1992); Heidi Hurd, The 
Deontology of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 249, 263-264 (1996); Michael Moore, Placing 
Blame: A General Theory of the Criminal Law 411-412 (1997).  See generally Stephen R. 
Perry, Risk, Harm, and Responsibility, in Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law 321 
(David G. Owen ed. Oxford, 1995). 
Michael Moore incorrectly attributes to me the view that negligence is a conduct 
requirement, not a mental state requirement. Moore, id. at 411.  My actual view is that 
some conceptions of negligence emphasize unreasonable conduct more than 
unreasonable beliefs or attitudes; but that even the unreasonable conduct conception 
ordinarily employs the idea of epistemic risk.  See Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 
supra note 9=, at 547-552. 
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actor’s conduct.40  An actor’s inadvertence to those risks, or an actor’s mistaken 
belief (that those risks are less than what this ideal perspective suggests), are 
two ways in which an actor might fail to view the risks with sufficient seriousness 
and therefore fail to take a reasonable precaution. 
Still, such instances of cognitive deficiency are not the only explanations 
of negligent conduct.  An actor who does advert to the risks and who makes a 
reasonable judgment about their significance can still act negligently if he 
misjudges the benefits of his conduct, or if he simply acts unreasonably in light of 
the risks and benefits.  In all of these cases, the ultimate judgment of fault 
concerns the actor’s conduct in light of his beliefs.  Although an idealized 
epistemic perspective is normally part of the conception of conduct negligence, 
that perspective operates to identify which risks are and are not justifiable.  It 
certainly does not imply that all instances of conduct negligent are due to 
cognitive deficiency.  Thus, the necessity of an epistemic perspective in judging 
conduct negligence does not mean that the tort conception of negligence 
ultimately is merely a restatement of the cognitive conception. 
Just as one can be reasonable in one’s beliefs yet act negligently, one 
can be unreasonable in one’s beliefs yet act reasonably.  A clear illustration of 
the point is the following type of case: an actor unreasonably underestimates or 
lacks awareness of specific risks, yet the actor’s response to possible risks is 
extraordinarily cautious, so that his precautions, in the end, are not negligent.  
Consider an example: 
 
(J) Jane, an elderly driver, forgets to check for traffic before taking a highway 
exit, but she also leaves her blinker on for an extended period of time and 
moves very slowly into the exit lane. 
 
                                                 
40 The idealized epistemic perspective can also be applied to the costs, and not just to 
the risk-reduction benefits, of taking a precaution. (For example, taking a precaution 
might create an uncertain but significant risk of additional injuries to a different group of 
potential victims.) 
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If this combination of inadvertence and extra precaution is no more risky than the 
actions of a careful, advertent driver who takes lesser precautions while exiting, 
then the elderly driver would not and should not be deemed negligent.41 
In other contexts, too, determining whether conduct is negligent does not 
depend on what the actor should have believed.  Careful observation and 
perception are neither necessary nor sufficient for careful conduct.42  An 
especially important category here, and one sometimes neglected in the 
negligence literature, is deficient skill in conducting an activity.  A person might 
be “hasty and awkward”43 and thereby cause an injury.  A surgeon’s hand might 
slip during an operation.  The operator of a bicycle or motor vehicle might fail to 
control the vehicle adequately due to slow reaction time or lack of dexterity.  In 
none of these cases is “unreasonable failure to foresee risks” an essential 
element of the analysis.44 
For all of these reasons, it is clear that conduct negligence does not 
collapse into cognitive negligence. 
C. Other varieties of negligence 
 
The concepts of conduct and cognitive negligence are more nuanced 
than they might first appear.  As we have seen, conduct negligence includes not 
only an unreasonable conscious judgment about whether to take a precaution, 
and unreasonable failure to take a precaution due to unreasonable inadvertence 
or mistake, but also deficient skill in conducting an activity.  To put the point 
                                                 
41 If an actor deliberately compensates for what she realizes is a personal deficiency in 
observing risks, her strategy is clearly reasonable. See Simons, Culpability and 
Retributive Theory, supra note 30=, at 374-375 n. 26.  However, Jane’s driving in the 
example is also reasonable even though if she did not consciously adopt such a 
compensatory strategy. 
42 Indeed, overly attentive and cautious drivers can sometimes be more dangerous than 
drivers who rely on safe habits.  See Joel Feinberg, Sua Culpa, in Doing and Deserving: 
Essays in the Theory of Responsibility 190 (1970). 
43 Cf. O. W. Holmes, The Common Law 108 (Little, Brown and Co. 1881). 
44 It is doubtful, however, that the fault exhibited by deficient skill is sufficiently serious 
that it should amount to criminal negligence. 
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differently, conduct negligence can consist in unreasonable conduct as judged by 
an evaluative standard, quite apart from whether the actor’s actual decision-
procedure reflects an unreasonable weighing of values and risks.45 
Moreover, a closer look at “cognitive” negligence reveals that it can 
encompass a variety of forms of fault, and that the supposedly sharp distinction 
between inadvertent fault (negligence) and advertent fault (recklessness) is often 
blurry indeed.  An actor might recognize a risk, but later forget about it.  She 
might believe that a risk of injury is very small, when she reasonably should have 
appreciated that it was much greater.46  She might be aware of relevant facts, yet 
fail to appreciate that they reveal the existence of a substantial risk.47  Or she 
might have a latent awareness of background risks (e.g., if asked, she would 
readily admit that driving quickly around a blind curve is potentially very 
dangerous), yet fail to bring that awareness to the forefront at the moment of 
action.  In all of these cases, fault exists in the general sense of an unreasonable 
failure of inference or an unreasonable failure to draw upon beliefs or 
perceptions,48 but it is difficult to say whether the actor is “advertent” or 
“inadvertent.” 
                                                 
45 See Simons, The Hand Formula, supra note 1=, at 932. 
46 Consider People v. Strong, 37 N.Y.2d 568 (1975).  Defendant, a Sudan Muslim who 
believed in the power of mind over matter, claimed that he believed it was safe to insert a 
knife into the chest of a fellow member of the cult, having allegedly done so safely many 
times before.  A claim by the defendant that he believed there was literally zero risk of 
injury from the procedure is not very credible.  (This is a question for the jury, however.  
Thus, when the trial court did not submit the charge of negligent homicide to the jury 
along with the manslaughter charge, it is understandable that the Court of Appeals 
reversed.) 
47 Thus, Restatement (Second) of Torts §12 distinguishes “reason to know” (where the 
actor actually has information from which he should infer a relevant fact), from “should 
know” (where the actor should ascertain the fact).  And the Draft Restatement (Third) of 
Torts provides that a person acts with recklessness if she either knows of the risk or 
“knows facts that make that risk obvious to anyone in the person’s situation.”  §2. 
48 See Simons, Culpability and Retributive Theory, supra note 30=, at 382-384; R.A. Duff, 
Intentions, Actions, and Criminal Liability 159-160 (Oxford: 1990); A. P. Simester, Can 
Negligence be Culpable?, Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, Fourth Series 85, 95 (J. 
Horder ed. 2000) (“What goes wrong when beliefs are faulty?  Either the belief that the 
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I have thus far focused on the use of a negligence criterion either as a 
general tort liability standard or as a culpability element in a criminal law offense.  
Of course, negligence and reasonableness criteria are employed more widely.  
Within tort law, reasonableness criteria govern the use of defensive force in a 
number of ways—with respect to the proportionality of the force used relative to 
that threatened, with respect to its necessity, and, finally with respect to the 
adequacy of the evidence for defendant’s beliefs concerning each of these 
matters.49  Negligent misrepresentation is a recognized tort.50  Negligence as to 
the falsity of a publication also plays an important role in defamation law.51  
Within criminal law, the rules of self-defense are sometimes even more elaborate 
than in tort law, and the proportionality and necessity requirements are frequently 
                                                                                                                                                 
defendant acts upon is unreasonably acquired, or there is some further belief, relevant to 
her behavior, that unreasonably is not considered.  Expressed in this way, it is the 
process by which the defendant accumulates and considers beliefs that has failed.”).  
See also Kimberly Ferzan, Opaque Recklessness, 91 J. Crim. L. & Criminol. = (2001) 
(forthcoming) (arguing that “recklessness” should not include all latent knowledge, but 
should extend to cases where the actor recognized the dangerousness of her conduct 
and at some preconscious level appreciated the risks that made her conduct dangerous). 
49 To justify the use of nondeadly defensive force, the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
requires that the degree of force simply be “reasonable” in proportion to that threatened, 
and also requires that the actor reasonably believe that he is under threat.  See §63.  To 
justify the use of deadly defensive force, the Restatement requires that the degree of 
force satisfy certain rule-like criteria specifying the circumstances in which such force is 
considered proportionate.  See §65.  More generally, a reasonableness requirement 
qualifies the exercise of a number of privileges to intentional torts.  See Dobbs, supra 
note 5=, §69, p. 157; id. at §70 (self-defense); id. at §76 (defense of possession of land 
or chattels); id. at §108 (public necessity). 
50 See Dobbs, id. at §472. 
51 See Dobbs, id. at §419, p. 1179, noting that, as a constitutional matter, even private 
plaintiffs must prove such negligence when the defamation touches on an issue of public 
concern. 
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specified in rule-like form, and not simply defined in terms of “reasonableness.”52  
Negligence criteria are frequently used outside of tort and criminal law as well.53 
 Moreover, negligence comes in more than two flavors.  For the concept of 
negligence or unreasonableness can be applied beyond beliefs and conduct, to 
encompass other features of the actor or the act.  Negligence criteria in self-
defense, for example, while often formally articulated in terms of beliefs, are also 
in substance criteria for reasonable or unreasonable control of one’s emotions 
and violent impulses.  Thus, suppose a self-defense provision requires that the 
actor “reasonably believe that immediate use of deadly force is necessary to 
avoid deadly force.”  The emergency circumstances and lack of time for calm 
judgment are certainly relevant to the reasonableness of a defender’s response.  
                                                 
52 See MPC §3.04. 
53 To take one of many examples from property law, the Restatement (Third) Property 
§6.13 frames a common interest community's duties to its members in terms of 
reasonableness: 
(a) to use ordinary care and prudence in managing the property and financial 
affairs of the community that are subject to its control; 
(b) to treat members fairly; 
(c) to act reasonably in the exercise of its discretionary powers including 
rulemaking, enforcement, and design control powers; 
(d) to provide members reasonable access to information about the association, 
the common property, and the financial affairs of the association. 
 
Moreover, the law of nuisance, at the borderland of tort and property, often 
employs reasonableness criteria.  See Dobbs, supra note 5=, Ch. 34.  The Restatement 
(Second) of Torts’ provisions on nuisance law are problematic, however, insofar as 
“unreasonableness” criteria govern both fault and strict liability.  See Simons, Rethinking 
Mental States, supra note 9=, at 494-495 n. 110.  Furthermore, according to Professor 
Dobbs: 
“Unreasonable” in nuisance law is not like “unreasonable” in the law of 
negligence, for it does not refer to risk-creating conduct of the defendant but to 
the reasonable expectations of a normal person occupying the plaintiff’s land. 
 
Dobbs, id. at 1326. 
In contract law, the duty of good faith is sometimes interpreted as requiring 
reasonable care, though a narrower interpretation requires only avoidance of certain 
forms of bad faith and dishonesty. See Uniform Commercial Code §1-203; Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts §205, comment a (1981); E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts §7.17 
(Aspen 1999). 
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Indeed, it is often unrealistic to expect an actor in such a crisis situation to form 
any clear and definite belief about the precise degree of force threatened or the 
availability of alternatives.  Accordingly, “reasonableness” is not just a question of 
justifiable “beliefs” about the nonexistence of alternative, less deadly forms of 
response.54  (Consider the example of Irma, above.) 
Finally, one might also characterize conative or desire states, such as 
culpable indifference or “extreme indifference to the value of human life,” as 
exhibiting one type of negligence—namely, a “negligent” or “unreasonable” 
attitude towards the suffering of others.55  It might, however, be best not to 
expand the “negligence” concept quite this far.56 
                                                 
54 See Simons, Rethinking Mental States, supra note 9=, at 548-549, n. 288.  See also 
Cynthia K. Y. Lee, The Act-Belief Distinction in Self-Defense Doctrine: A New Dual 
Requirement Theory of Justification, 2 Buff. Criminal. L. Rev. 191 (1998) (arguing that 
self-defense standards should more explicitly distinguish requirements of reasonable 
belief and reasonable conduct); Restatement (Second) of Torts, §70, comment b (“[T]he 
qualities which primarily characterize a reasonable man [for purposes of self-defense] are 
ordinary courage and firmness.”). 
Indeed, the criminal law implicitly recognizes a spectrum of degrees of fault in 
failing to control one’s violent impulses.  The defendant who responds to a mild insult with 
homicidal rage is guilty of murder; the defendant who responds to a more serious 
provocation is guilty of the lesser crime of voluntary manslaughter; and the defendant 
who responds to deadly force might not be guilty of any crime.  Of course, these three 
legal categories are not expressly defined in terms of varying degrees of deficiency of 
self-control; still, this type of deficiency at least partly explains the categories. 
Some self-defense cases also illustrate the point that reasonable care might 
embrace both justified conduct and conduct that is unjustified but excused.  See text at 
notes 83-85= infra. 
55 See R. A. Duff, supra note 45=, Ch. 7; Simons, Culpability and Retributive Theory, 
supra note 30=, at 375-379. 
56 See Henry W. Edgerton, Negligence, Inadvertence, and Indifference; The Relation of 
Mental States to Negligence, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 849 (1926)(rejecting the view that 
negligence requires a culpable mental state of indifference).  See also Simons, 
Culpability and Retributive Theory, supra note 30=, at 375-379, for discussion of some 
difficulties with a conative conception of negligence. 
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Thus, there are many ways that an actor’s beliefs, desires, temperament, 
reasoning powers, emotional self-control, capacities for physical dexterity, and 
other characteristics can issue in deficient or “unreasonable” conduct.  This 
variety is obscured if we limit our attention to a univocal concept of “negligent” 
conduct or of “negligent” cognition. 
VI. Distinct legal functions of the negligence concept 
 
The discussion above of the similarities between the tort and criminal law 
conceptions of negligence identified several important commonalities.  Each 
conception employs an evaluative rather than descriptive criterion; incorporates a 
“reasonableness” standard; embodies a conclusive judgment that the relevant 
conduct or belief was unjustified; considers the “risk” or “chance” of a harm 
occurring or a fact existing; and distinguishes between the existence of such a 
risk or chance, on one hand, and the harm actually coming to pass, or the fact 
actually existing, on the other. 
Consistent with these commonalities, however, negligence standards are 
employed in law in a number of different ways.  In the following, I identify five 
important functions57 that such standards serve: expressing a legal norm in the 
form of a standard rather than a rule; personifying fault; empowering the trier of 
fact to give content to the standard; creating a secondary legal norm parasitic on 
a primary legal norm; and distinguishing grades of fault.  The significance of the 
function sometimes depends on whether the conduct or cognitive conception of 
negligence is at issue, as we shall see.  But the different functions also represent 
an additional set of dimensions of the negligence concept, dimensions that are 
important in their own right. 
These functions, although distinct in principle, are by no means mutually 
exclusive.  In examining them, I sometimes speculate about how a legal regime 
                                                 
57 By suggesting that negligence standards serve different “functions,” I do not mean to 
presuppose that the underlying normative rationale for negligence liability itself is 
instrumental or consequentialist. Rather, I only suggest that it is worth attending to some 
distinctive institutional roles that legal negligence standards play.  These roles or 
functions are consistent with retributive and corrective justice, as well as utilitarian, 
accounts of the content of a negligence standard and of its rationale. 
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would look if it focused principally on the function under discussion.  The analysis 
will show that we could avoid some misconceptions and confusions about the 
significance and justifiability of employing negligence standards if we were 
clearer about which function we wish to employ. 
 
A.   Express the legal norm in the form of a standard rather than a rule 
 
If a legal criterion provides that conduct or a belief must be “negligent” or 
“unreasonable,” the legal norm takes the form of a relatively vague standard 
rather than a relatively precise rule.  There are many ways to distinguish between 
standards and rules; for our purposes, the most important distinction is in terms 
of the specificity of the norm.  This distinction is one of degree.  At the most 
abstract, negligent conduct could be simply “unreasonable conduct” or 
“unreasonably risky conduct.”  In tort law, indeed, an extremely general and fairly 
abstract standard is employed: liability exists for any negligently caused physical 
harm, and negligence is defined in very general terms.58  At the same time, more 
specific standards are employed in particular tort contexts.  In products liability, 
for example, the criteria for design and warning defects are effectively negligence 
tests, adapted to the relevant features of that subject matter.59  Often, when tort 
law identifies with precision the scope or limits of the actor’s duty, the point is to 
crystallize into more rule-like form the meaning of “negligence” in a particular 
                                                 
58 See Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts, §6 ( “An actor who negligently causes physical 
harm is subject to liability for that harm.”).  See also id., §3 (identifying the primary factors 
to be balanced in ascertaining whether an actor is negligent).  Moreover, jury instructions 
in negligence cases often merely ask the jury to decide, without further elaboration, what 
would be reasonable or ordinary care under the circumstances.  See Michael Wells, 
Scientific Policymaking And The Torts Revolution: The Revenge Of The Ordinary 
Observer, 26 Ga. L. Rev. 725, 732 (1992). 
59 Thus, in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability, the criteria for determining 
design and warning defects consider whether “reasonable” alternative designs exist, 
whether “reasonable” warnings are feasible, and whether the omission of such designs or 
warnings “renders the product not reasonably safe” for “reasonably foreseeable uses and 
risks.”  §2 (ALI 1998); see id. at §2, cmt e, f, and n. 
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context.60  And special rules apply to particular types of harm: thus, American tort 
law permits only limited liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress or 
economic harm.61 
Criminal law uses the concept of negligence much less pervasively than 
tort law does, and for good reason.  The negligence concept, even if articulated 
somewhat by such criteria as “reasonable person in the community” or risk-utility 
balancing, remains fundamentally vague.62  To employ such a standard more 
extensively in the criminal law would present serious problems of fair notice and 
unreviewable discretion.  Of course, there is also a serious question whether tort 
negligence is ever sufficiently faulty to warrant criminal liability; but even if an 
aggravated form of tort negligence (such as “gross negligence”) were the 
standard, pervasive use of such a standard would remain highly troublesome. 
At the same time, however, implicit negligence criteria are employed 
more widely, even in the criminal law.   Even a norm that is quite “rule-like” could, 
in substance, be a negligence norm, if it identifies behavior that is comparable in 
fault or culpability to behavior described simply as “negligent” or “grossly 
negligent.”  One must carefully examine the norm’s conduct, circumstance, and 
result requirements, and also the norm’s rationale, in order to determine what 
degree of substantive fault or culpability is embodied in a norm.  For example, a 
legal duty never to drive at an excessive speed, or never to use hand-held cell 
phones while driving, is just a codification, in rule-like form, of the duty not to 
drive negligently.63 
                                                 
60 See Simons, The Hand Formula, supra note 1=, at 927. 
61 Dobbs, supra note 5, §3.08. 
62 For a powerful statement of this objection, concluding that the vagueness of the 
negligence standard is highly problematic even as applied to tort law, see Kenneth 
Abraham, The Trouble with Negligence, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1187 (2001). 
63 Moreover, one must also look beyond the explicit legal culpability requirements (or lack 
thereof) of a legal norm, in order to determine what degree of substantive fault or 
culpability it embodies.  Thus, if the legal duty is not to “knowingly” use hand-held cell 
phones while driving, that duty still is essentially an instance of the duty not to drive 
negligently.  Even a norm that contains no explicit culpability requirements could 
nonetheless reflect fault, and indeed might, as applied, more effectively target persons 
who are at fault than would a nominal fault requirement.  Consider an apparently “strict 
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The distinction between understanding negligence as a rule and 
understanding it as a standard can be made even more vivid by conducting the 
following two thought-experiments. 
First, following a suggestion by Heidi Hurd,64 imagine replacing the 
general negligence standard in tort law with a set of minirules or minimaxims of 
the following sort: 
 
• Don’t use a hand-held cell phone while driving. 
 
• Stop, look, and listen before crossing a train track.65 
 
• Don’t perform a medical operation unless you are experienced in the 
technique. 
 
• Don’t prescribe drug X for condition Y in the face of contraindications 
Z1 and Z2. 
 
Second, and more heroically, imagine the converse type of replacement.  
All the specific norms of the criminal law—regulating particular types of theft, 
infliction of personal injury, invasion of sexual autonomy, breaches of public trust, 
and so forth—are replaced by a global norm: 
 
• Don’t act unreasonably. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
liability” rule such as a criminal prohibition against selling alcohol to a person who has not 
produced a form of identification.  Such a rule might, in actual application, more 
accurately identify persons who negligently sell alcohol to those under age than would a 
standard explicitly framed in negligence terms.  See Simons, When is Strict Criminal 
Liability Just?, supra note 36=, at 1125-1131. 
The ability of the law-creator to manipulate both offense elements and 
accompanying culpability terms means that statutory or other legal “culpability” criteria 
have only secondary significance.  For a further discussion of this issue, see Simons, 
Culpability and Retributive Theory, supra note 30=, at 394-397 (discussing varying 
culpability requirements and varying definitions of nonconsent in the law of rape). 
64 See Hurd, supra note 39=, at 266-268. 
65 Cf. Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 70 (1927), overruled in Pokora v. 
Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98 (1934). 
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Or, to preserve the usual understanding that negligence requires only the most 
minimal degree of fault, imagine replacing all current crimes (at least, those not 
reflecting genuine strict liability) that impose the most minimal level of 
punishment with this norm: 
 
• Don’t act in an unreasonable way that deserves minimal criminal 
punishment. 
 
And we might similarly replace all other crimes, however seriously they are now 
punished, by adopting a series of norms of escalating fault or culpability: 
 
• Don’t act in an unreasonable way that deserves moderate criminal 
punishment. 
 
• Don’t act in an unreasonable way that deserves moderately serious 
criminal punishment. 
 
• Don’t act in an unreasonable way that deserves serious criminal 
punishment. 
 
Both replacements clearly are objectionable, but why, exactly, is this so? 
The complete replacement of a negligence standard with specific rules 
that abjure any mention of reasonableness or negligence raises two significant 
problems.66  The first problem is scope: it is impossible to articulate in advance 
specific rules to cover the full range of ways in which one might be at fault and 
risk harm to others.  Even Oliver Wendell Holmes lacked the foresight to 
announce a rule for cell phones. 
The second problem is a difference in content.  An articulation of 
negligence in the form of a rule will ordinarily differ from its articulation in the form 
of a standard: to paraphrase G.E. Moore, it is always an open question whether 
violating a rule (such as the rule about using cell phones) really is negligent in 
every imaginable case.67 
                                                 
66 See Hurd, supra note 39=, at 266-268, whose arguments I restate and modify 
somewhat in the next two paragraphs. 
67 Similarly, it is an open question whether complying with a rule intended to substitute for 
a negligence standard is always non-negligent.  If it is negligent to sell alcohol to a minor, 
then a substitute rule forbidding the sale of alcohol to one who has not furnished two 
forms of identification might be both overinclusive and underinclusive.  For example, it 
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Perhaps these defects of substituting rules for standards could be 
addressed by adding a requirement that the rule violation be “unjustified.”  But 
this change would undermine the advantages of the rule-like form, bringing us 
closer to the standard-like formulation of negligence.  The tort doctrine of 
negligence per se is illustrative here.  Insofar as violation of a criminal statute is 
considered negligence “per se,” i.e., without engaging in the normal (standard-
like) inquiry into whether the actor used reasonable care under all the 
circumstances, the doctrine is a rule-like form of negligence.  Yet the doctrine is 
not applied mechanically; and courts are receptive to at least some justificatory 
defenses.68  The broader the defenses, however, the less the rule-like form 
achieves its distinctive benefits of certainty and predictability. 
Now consider the converse thought-experiment: replacing all existing 
criminal law rules with a simple injunction not to act unreasonably (or with a 
series of such injunctions graded only by degree of unreasonableness).  Such a 
standard would not merely lack the virtues of rules (including notice, 
predictability, and control of discretion).  It would also conceal or mischaracterize 
the disparate and distinctive normative commitments embodied in the separate 
criminal law categories.  For it would treat such values as sexual autonomy, 
bodily integrity, property interests, and duties of loyalty to a nation as fully 
commensurable exemplifications of a more general criterion of unreasonable 
conduct.  The fact that the existing criminal law clearly differentiates these 
different types of wrongs would have to be understood as merely an historical 
anachronism or a convenient drafting shorthand for recurring fact patterns.  
                                                                                                                                                 
would be overinclusive if the seller provides alcohol to his own overage son without 
checking identification, and underinclusive if the seller is acquainted with the buyer and 
knows that he is underage, despite apparently valid identification. 
68 See Simons, Strict Liability, supra note 36=, at 1126 n. 162.  The Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, although purporting to treat violation of statutes as conclusive 
evidence of negligence, also provides some broad, all-purpose defenses: violation of a 
law or regulation may be excused “when [the actor] is unable after reasonable diligence 
or care to comply, … [or when] compliance would involve a greater risk of harm to the 
actor or to others.”  §288A (2) (c), (e).  The Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts is quite 
similar.  §15 (b), (e). 
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Although I cannot pursue the issue here, it is highly doubtful that the topography 
of fault is as flat and boring as this. 
 
B.   Personify fault 
 
Another important function of a negligence norm is to personify fault.  
Negligence is often defined as the failure to observe the degree of care in 
conduct (or in forming beliefs) that a reasonable person in the situation would 
observe.  But this “reasonable person” formulation is only one possible 
formulation of negligence.  (Notice that I have avoided employing this formulation 
in the text until now.)  Moreover, defining negligence only as the care that “a 
reasonable person” or “a reasonable person in the community” would exercise, 
without further elaboration, is problematic.  Such a criterion is obscure, and there 
is a significant danger that the standard will be applied inconsistently across 
similar fact patterns.69 
What, then, is gained by anthropomorphizing the negligence test?  If 
employed in conjunction with a Learned Hand or other specification of the factors 
relevant to a negligence determination, one significant benefit is to make vivid a 
negligent standard that might otherwise be extremely abstract.70  This benefit 
might be especially valuable if a lay jury is to apply the standard.71  But does a 
“reasonable person” standard amount only to a useful rhetorical device for 
helping the factfinder to analyze and apply the (otherwise abstract) 
considerations that are relevant to the negligence inquiry?  If negligence should 
be understood as an unreasonable balance of the advantages and 
disadvantages of taking a precaution, perhaps the reasonable person is just the 
person who balances those advantages and disadvantages in a reasonable 
                                                 
69 See Simons, The Hand Formula, supra note 1=, at 930-931. 
70 Under the Learned Hand test, failure to take a precaution is negligent if the burden (B) 
of taking the precaution is less than the risks of injury that the precaution would prevent, 
where risk is the product of the probability of an injury (P) and its severity (L).  In short, 
one is negligent if B < P x L. 
71 Simons, The Hand Formula, supra note 1=, at 931. 
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way.72  The “reasonable person” formulation then adds nothing of substance to 
the content of the negligence test. 
But personification might also serve three additional functions.  First, it 
seems preferable to an “impersonal” Learned Hand balancing test in accounting 
for cases of deficient skill in conducting an activity.  The surgeon whose hand 
slips during surgery, or the bicyclist who loses control despite the utmost 
attention to the risks, act carelessly, but we misdescribe their fault if we try to 
characterize it as an unreasonable balance of the advantages and disadvantages 
of taking a precaution.  The very fact that they are not consciously balancing any 
considerations is a telling objection to using a risk/utility test as the exclusive 
criterion of negligence.73   
Second, a reasonable person test can readily be calibrated along the 
dimension of individualization: In asking what a reasonable person “under all the 
circumstances”74 or “in the actor’s situation”75 would have done, we can relativize 
negligence to certain individual capacities and traits.  At the same time, other 
forms of individualization can be rejected, for prudential or principled reasons.  
Hence, “the reasonable blind person,” “the reasonable ten-year old of similar 
intelligence and experience,” and “the reasonable person who has been mugged 
                                                 
72 See Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts §3, comment a. 
 Also, in cases of inadvertent negligence, when the actor is not consciously 
weighing advantages and disadvantages of taking a risk, the balancing or calculus of risk 
analysis that many negligence tests call for is often inapt.  The anthropomorphic test then 
appears to give some guidance.  See Simons, id. at 931-933; Draft Restatement (Third) 
of Torts, §3, comment k.  Still, whatever genuine guidance it does provide would derive 
from the specific content given to “the reasonable person.”  That test is still a normative 
one, not a test of customary conduct.  And the test would ideally be more fully articulated, 
e.g. as “a reasonable person considerate of the interests of others,” in order to provide 
guidance. 
73 These examples also illustrate that the negligence standard is sometimes used as a 
standard of evaluation, not as a decision-procedure.  See text at note 45= supra. 
74 See Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts, §3. 
75 See MPC, §2.02(2)(d).  See also id., §210.3(1)(b) (providing for individuation in the 
context of murder mitigated by reason of “extreme emotional disturbance,” which is the 
MPC’s version of voluntary manslaughter). 
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before,” but not “the reasonable racist” or “the reasonable hot-head.”76  The 
“reasonable person” formulation seems especially well-suited to articulating the 
situations that do and do not call for relativizing the reasonableness standard.77 
Could we take the anthropomorphic approach much farther?  Might we 
simplify the analysis of negligence by employing a “super-personification”?  In 
lieu of the daunting range of negligence conceptions identified in this paper, 
perhaps we could ask a single question—namely, whether the actor failed to 
satisfy a standard of reasonableness in any respect whatsoever (beliefs, desires, 
self-control, conduct, and so forth) that could possibly affect legal culpability or 
responsibility.  On this view, reasonable care is the care that a person would take 
if the person were to have reasonable beliefs and also reasonable values, if he 
were to reasonably moderate or balance conflicting desires, exercise reasonable 
self-control, draw reasonable inferences, act with reasonable skill, and the like.78  
                                                 
76 Cf. People v. Goetz, 68 N.Y. 2d 96 (N.Y. 1986). 
77 To be sure, individualization might also be analyzed in other ways.  One might ask, not 
whether a reasonable blind person would employ the precaution of using a cane in 
crossing the street, but whether and how a socially acceptable balance of the advantages 
and disadvantages of taking that precaution would include consideration of the actor’s 
blindness.  Still, analyzing legally relevant (and irrelevant) capacities in anthropomorphic 
terms is less abstract and often more intelligible. 
78 See Michael Moore, Law and Psychiatry: Rethinking the Relationship 84 (Cambridge 
1984)  (the reasonable person embodies “those qualities of character that we think 
people should possess, and those capacities of mind that we think all people do 
possess”); Jeremy Horder, Criminal Culpability: The Possibility of a General Theory, 12 
Law & Philos. 193, 207 (1993) (the criterion of minimal criminal culpability should refer to 
“an idealised conception of an agent of good character”).  See also Simons, The Hand 
Formula, supra note 1=, at 933-934 (discussing the virtue theory account of negligence, 
which might naturally take the form of “super-personification”). 
Moreover, one could imagine replacing all torts and crimes with a standard that 
merely asks whether the actor modestly, seriously, or very seriously departed from the 
reasonable person standard.  Indeed, in the more limited domain of risky conduct causing 
physical harm, current tort doctrine occasionally asks whether the actor is “grossly 
negligent” in the sense of grossly departing from the standard of care that a reasonable 
person would observe.  However, a broad substitution rule would pose the same 
problems noted in the prior section. 
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But, quite apart from the forbidding problems of vagueness and unequal 
enforcement posed by such a test, the test is unacceptable.  First, it offers an 
overly idealized and homogeneous model of legally permissible behavior.  
Reasonable people differ in their values, in their beliefs, in their skills, in 
numerous other ways.  In a pluralist society, diversity of values is a positive good, 
and a good to be acknowledged in negligence law as elsewhere.79  Second, 
employing only such a superpersonification would made it very difficult to judge 
the reasonableness of an action if (as is virtually always the case) in some 
respects the actor or action falls below (or rises above) the standard of 
reasonableness.  Yet the law must, and does, make such “partial” 
reasonableness judgments.  Thus, suppose that assaulting a police officer is an 
aggravated form of assault.  A reasonable person would not assault another; but 
we might, for grading purposes, wish to inquire whether a person who commits 
an assault should have known that his victim was a police officer.  At the same 
time, an actor might adventitiously possess greater knowledge of some facts 
than a “reasonable” person would possess (for example, he might be aware of 
the existence of a pothole on a particular street); and the judgment of negligence 
should ordinarily consider the additional knowledge that the actor actually 
possesses.80  More generally, for certain forms of fault such as cognitive 
negligence, it is relatively easy to isolate the fault and ask whether, apart from 
that fault, the person acted reasonably.  We can readily evaluate whether, given 
an actual unreasonable belief,  an actor’s encountering a risk was reasonable.81 
Third, this global “supertest” precludes separate analysis of different 
dimensions of unreasonableness, yet separate analysis is often desirable.  
                                                 
79 See generally Guido Calabresi, Ideals, Beliefs, Attitudes, and the Law (Syracuse 
1985). 
80 See, e.g., Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts, §12.  Under this provision, actors are also 
judged by the above-average skills that they happen to possess. 
81 However, for other forms of fault, isolating the fault in this manner is more difficult.  
Consider the claim that the actor has an “unreasonable” set of desires or values.  
Normally one cannot intelligibly pose the question whether, given that he happened to 
possess those values, the actor nevertheless acted reasonably.  See Simons, Culpability 
and Retributive Theory, supra note 30=, at 376-377.  (But note that the insanity defense 
might be the exception that “proves” this rule.) 
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Deficient attention or skill might be considered less morally significant than 
deficient judgment about whether to take a known risk or deficient control of 
violent impulses, and thus less worthy of legal liability.  The culpability structure 
of the criminal law, in particular, presupposes that the significance of 
“unreasonableness” depends on the context, including the offense element to 
which it attaches.  For example, the Model Penal Code’s basic distinction 
between negligent inadvertence and recklessness is based on the judgment that 
an actor who is unreasonably unaware of a risk presumptively deserves less 
punishment than an actor who is aware of a risk but unreasonably proceeds to 
encounter it.  After all, we normally cannot be confident that the inadvertent actor 
would have proceeded to unreasonably encounter the risk had he been aware of 
it.82 
A final possible value of personification is to articulate a notion of 
reasonable care that includes excused as well as justified conduct. Suppose we 
are considering what action would constitute “reasonable care” in an emergency.  
If we conclude that excused as well as justified conduct is “reasonable,” then it 
might be helpful to employ a “reasonable person faced with an emergency” test 
to accommodate this idea—i.e, the idea that a person in an emergency might 
make a decision that is unjustified but understandable, taking into account such 
emotions as fear or panic as well as the short time-frame for choice.83  By 
                                                 
82 See Simons, id. at 374.  On the other hand, when an actor is inadvertent but culpably 
indifferent to risk, his blameworthiness is sometimes as serious as that of the advertent 
actor.  This might be so, for example, if it were clear that, had the inadvertent actor been 
aware of the risk, he would have taken it, id. at 381, or if the reason for his lack of 
awareness is intoxication, anger or a similar unjustifiable cause.  Id. at 388.  See also 
Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law 185-187 (3rd ed. Oxford 1999) (noting that 
an actor who is inadvertent to risk because he acts impulsively or in anger can be as 
blameworthy as an advertent actor).  Moreover, it is also relevant whether the advertent 
actor honestly (though mistakenly) believes that he can avoid the risk entirely.  If so, the 
advertent actor might be less culpable than many inadvertent actors.  See Jeremy 
Horder, How Culpability Can, and Cannot, be Denied in Under-age Sex Crimes, Crim. L. 
Rev. 15, 20 (2001). 
83 See Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts, §9, comments b and c, p. 122 (supporting an 
excuse rationale, insofar as “the person’s judgment may have been less sound than 
usual” and the person may have “made the less satisfactory choice.”)  To be sure, many 
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contrast, a nonpersonified test (such as “a reasonable balance of the advantages 
and disadvantages of a precaution”) cannot so easily accommodate the idea of 
unjustified but excused conduct.  In criminal law, similarly, one formulation of the 
excuse of duress considers what a person of “reasonable firmness” would do in 
response to a threat.84 
Although a reasonable person test is especially useful in articulating a 
conception of negligence as conduct that is both unjustified and unexcused, this 
is ironic.  The “reasonable person” formulation is one of the most traditional ways 
of articulating negligence.  And yet, shielding from negligence liability conduct 
that is unjustified (albeit excused) is in tension with one of the distinguishing 
characteristics of negligence itself: that it is an all-things-considered judgment 
that the actor’s conduct or belief is deficient and unjustified.  On the other hand, 
insofar as negligence is understood as a derivative legal concept, parasitic on 
other legal norms (see category D, below), and insofar as primary legal norms do 
offer defenses of both justification and excuse, the view that excused conduct is 
not negligent is less surprising.85 
                                                                                                                                                 
emergency decisions are justifiable ex ante, even though an alternative choice, in 
hindsight, would have been better.  But some actions in an emergency are not justifiable 
ex ante; for these, the question of excuse arises. 
84 See MPC, §2.09(1).  Some formulations of the partial excuse of provocation, similarly, 
ask whether a reasonable person would lose control of their emotions under the 
circumstances.  See Dressler, supra note 15, § 31.07, at 529 (provocation is deemed 
adequate for mitigation if it would prompt a reasonable person to act from passion rather 
than reason); LaFave, supra note 15, § 7.10[b], 705 (“‘reasonable provocation’ is 
provocation which causes a reasonable man to lose his normal self-control”).  See also 
Samuel H. Pillsbury, Judging Evil: Rethinking the Law of Murder and Manslaughter, 128-
30 (New York University Press 1998) (under the modern psychological approach, the 
emphasis is on “the intensity of emotion experienced by the accused and its impact on 
his choice-making abilities”). 
85 The Model Penal Code does not clarify whether unjustified but excused conduct is 
necessarily non-negligent.  On the one hand, its definitions of negligence and 
recklessness refer to “unjustified” but not to “unexcused” risk-taking.  §2.02 (2) (c), (d).  
On the other hand, the definitions also refer to the standard of care that a reasonable 
person would observe “in the actor’s situation,” a qualification that is intended to permit 
courts to consider a wide range of individualizing conditions.  MPC §2.02, cmt. 4, 242.  
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 C.   Empower the trier of fact to give content to the legal standard 
 
A negligence standard often has a third important function: as applied, the 
standard effectively results in delegation of lawmaking power to the trier of fact.  
A general tort standard of negligence, whether defined in anthropomorphic terms 
as “the care that a reasonable person would exercise” or in balancing terms as “a 
duty to take a precaution if the costs of a precaution are less than its foreseeable 
benefits,” does not have a very definite content.  When applied to a given fact 
pattern, however, its content is necessarily specified.  The trier of fact (either trial 
judge or jury) is the legal body that gives content to this standard.  Similarly, in 
criminal law, the legislature typically provides a very general definition of 
negligence, while the jury, in applying the standard, provides specific content. 
On this view, “negligence” is similar to “unreasonable restraints of trade” 
under the Sherman Act and to any other vague legal standard that is enunciated 
by one legal decisionmaker but given more specific content by a different one.  
The second decisionmaker could, in theory, be an administrative agency, a court, 
or a jury; in negligence law, the decisionmaker is either the judge or jury, acting 
as trier of fact.  This third function of a negligence test overlaps significantly with 
its first function (as a fault standard rather than a rule): the more specifically 
negligence is pre-defined by an appellate court or a legislature, the less power 
the ultimate factfinder has to give content to the standard.86 
The tort and criminal law standards of self-defense are an interesting 
example of how negligence can function as a delegation of law-making authority 
to another legal body.  Such standards typically include both predefined, rule-like 
criteria of proportionality and necessity, and also standard-like residual criteria for 
                                                                                                                                                 
And it is possible that those conditions encompass some excuses (e.g, a panicky 
reaction to an emergency). 
86 In principle, though, the functions are distinct.  Imagine a legal system in which an 
administrator has authority to adopt whatever normative standard she feels appropriate, 
and suppose she adopts a standard of negligence and applies it to the cases before her.  
In such a system, the allocation of decisionmaking function would no longer be served, 
but the standard v. rule issue would persist. 
Page 39 of 57 Simons, Dimensions of Negligence  8/7/02 
the reasonableness of the defender’s belief, and, sometimes, for certain 
proportionality and necessity issues.  Thus, the proportionality criteria for 
permissible use of deadly force are often predefined in rule-like form, while the 
proportionality criteria for use of nondeadly force are often defined only in terms 
of “reasonableness,” effectively delegating this judgment to the trier of fact.87  
The question of the duty to retreat before using deadly force (an aspect both of 
necessity and proportionality) is sometimes predefined but sometimes treated as 
just an aspect of the delegated issue whether a reasonable alternative means 
was available to the actor other than deadly force.88  The evaluation of the 
reasonableness of the actor’s beliefs—that his action was proportional (as 
predefined) or necessary—is normally delegated to the fact-finder, though even 
here, one could imagine a predefined criterion.89 
The practice of delegating substantial discretion to the factfinder to apply 
a vague normative standard of negligence or reasonableness often grants a 
largely unreviewable power to create a new legal norm.90  This practice obviously 
raises serious legality concerns, especially in the criminal law.  Accordingly, it is 
highly desirable to restrict the use of such standards in the criminal law, or to 
define them with much greater care.  However, this concern is less troubling in 
the case of cognitive negligence, for it is often fair to assume that different 
factfinders will have similar views about the “reasonableness” of an actor’s 
beliefs about a particular matter.91  Accordingly, permitting the jury to decide, in a 
                                                 
87 In criminal law, see MPC, §§3.04(1), (2)(b), 3.09(2); Dressler, supra note 15=, §18.01. 
In tort law, see Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§63, 65, 70. 
88 For a good discussion of the alternative approaches, see Bonnie, Coughlin, Jeffries, & 
Low, Criminal Law (Foundation Press 1997), p. 352. 
89 Somewhat greater predefinition occurs if the negligence criterion refers to the beliefs of 
the average (rather than reasonable) person in the community, or to customary practice 
(as when medical malpractice depends on whether the doctor possessed customary 
knowledge relevant to diagnosing or treating the patient’s medical condition).  It also 
occurs if a tort standard demands (reasonable) inferences only from facts of which the 
defender was actually aware.  See note 47= supra (noting the tort concept of “reason to 
know”). 
90 See Abraham, supra note 62=, at 1190-1199. 
91 See Simons, Negligence, supra note 1=, at 88. 
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prosecution for negligent homicide, whether the actor created an “unreasonable” 
risk of death without providing much guidance about the meaning of that term, is 
more troubling than permitting a similarly unguided jury to decide, in a 
hypothetical prosecution for a crime of “negligent receipt of stolen property,” 
whether the actor “should have realized” that the property was stolen. 
 
D. Create a secondary legal norm parasitic on a primary legal norm 
 
A fourth and highly important function of negligence is to serve as a 
secondary legal norm parasitic on a primary legal norm.  On this perspective, 
conduct negligence amounts to creating a substantial and unjustifiable risk of 
violating a primary legal norm.  And cognitive negligence amounts to 
unreasonable ignorance or mistake  about the possibility that one’s conduct is 
violating a primary legal norm.  In a loose sense, both types of negligence can be 
characterized as secondary legal norms against “creating an unreasonable risk” 
of violating a primary legal norm.92 
For example, a primary legal norms forbids the unjustified killing of 
another.  The fault in negligent homicide then consists of the following: creating a 
substantial and unjustifiable93 risk that one will bring about the (unjustifiable) 
                                                 
92 See Hurd, supra note 39=, at 264; Heidi Hurd, Justification and Excuse, Wrongdoing 
and Culpability, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1551, 1558 (1999) (“Moral culpability consists in 
intending to do an action that is wrongful, knowing that one will do an action that is 
wrongful, or failing to infer from available evidence that one will do an action that is 
wrongful.”); Moore, supra note 39=, at 411 (“[W]e … blame people for risking that their 
actions might be of a wrongful sort even when they do not desire, intend, or believe that 
their actions will be of that sort.”); Simester, supra note 48=, at 89 (“The fact that an 
action is harmful or to be avoided generates two types of moral reason: a reason not [to 
choose] to do that action, and a reason to take care lest that action be done.”) 
The statement in the text is a bit loose insofar as cognitive negligence involves 
“possibility,” not “risk,” and need not, strictly speaking, involve unreasonable risk-creation.  
See text at note 29= supra. 
93 It might appear redundant to require, for negligent homicide, both that the actor was 
unjustified* in creating the risk and also that the killing he risked was (or would have 
been) unjustified**.  But the dual requirement (that the risk be unjustified* and the killing 
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killing of another. Now consider a case involving cognitive rather than conduct 
negligence.  A primary legal norm forbids nonconsensual sexual intercourse with 
another.  The “negligence” in negligent rape then amounts to acting in 
unreasonable ignorance of (or based on an unreasonable mistake about) the 
possibility that the victim does not consent, and thus that one’s conduct is in 
violation of this primary norm. 
Ordinarily, this parasitic function is a necessary feature of negligence.94  
After all, the reason that unjustifiable risk-creation is blameworthy, or unfair, or 
important to deter, is not because risk-creation is itself wrongful, but only 
because it can lead to a (primary) wrong.95  If we have no reason to think that the 
“risky” conduct could lead to further harm, the conduct is not really risky at all.96 
                                                                                                                                                 
be unjustified**) is not redundant.  For the first form of lack of justification is broader: it 
addresses whether, ex ante, the actor had sufficient reason to create the risk, unlike the 
second form of lack of justification, which addresses whether, ex post, the killing itself 
was warranted.  Thus, an unjustified** killing is one that, ex post, we know was not 
warranted (for example, by self-defense, law enforcement, or necessity).  In contrast, 
whether risk-creation is justified* or unjustified* takes into account that the actor was only 
creating a risk of death; and such an act is much easier to justify.  For example, if Xavier 
rushes his two very sick children to the hospital and unfortunately causes a fatal accident 
along the way, he is only justified** in causing the death if both children would otherwise 
have died (and perhaps not even then).  But it is far more likely that he will be justified* in 
speeding to the hospital, notwithstanding the death that he caused.  
94 I qualify this assertion because cases of deficient skill are not so obviously parasitic on 
wrongdoing. On the other hand, perhaps even these cases are derivative in the relevant 
sense.  When a surgeon’s hand slips during an operation, the reason she is negligent is 
not simply that she was clumsy.  It is also critical that, in the actual circumstances, her 
clumsiness creates a great risk to another’s health.  Put differently: if she were to move 
her hand deliberately in precisely the manner that she accidentally moved it, she would 
clearly create an unreasonable risk; in this sense, the fault displayed by the accidental 
act is derivative of the fault displayed by the hypothesized deliberate act, which in turn is 
derivative of the wrongfulness of causing unjustified harm to a patient. 
95 To be sure, judging someone to be negligent is a conclusive judgment of fault, whether 
or not the negligence results in harm on a given occasion.  In this sense, acting 
negligently itself seems to violate a primary norm of wrongdoing.  But the negligence 
judgment also depends on an ex ante judgment about future risks.  If there were no 
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Indeed, if we all knew to a certainty the results (both beneficial and 
harmful) of all of our actions, there would be little need for a negligence 
standard.97  Instead, a varied set of legal norms would undoubtedly develop, 
along these lines: 
                                                                                                                                                 
reason to expect a particular type of (allegedly) negligent act to result in harm on any 
occasion, the actor would not be negligent. 
A separate question is the proper treatment of risky conduct that causes 
secondary harms, including fear to potential victims and emotional distress to bystanders 
not themselves at risk.  These harms are genuine and are sometimes a basis for legal 
liability.  And, at first blush, liability for causing such harms seems to be a 
counterexample to the present “derivative of primary norms” rationale for negligence.  On 
the other hand, these secondary harms are often insufficient to explain or justify the 
severity of such legal sanctions as criminal punishment for attempts or for speeding well 
above the speed limit.  Rather, the ex ante risk of future harm is also critical to that 
explanation; thus, the occurrence of secondary harms does not place a risk outside the 
“derivative” rationale under discussion.  For example, attempted murder by use of a 
normally effective means such as a loaded gun is properly punished more severely than 
a malicious practical joke in which the actor points a realistic toy gun at a stranger (or at a 
collaborator in the presence of bystanders not privy to the joke).  For the latter cases 
implicate only secondary harms, while the former also involves a very significant ex ante 
risk. 
96 Similarly, if we have no reason to think that an actor’s belief that his conduct is legally 
permissible (e.g. that the victim is consenting) could possibly be incorrect, then there is 
no real possibility that his conduct is in violation of the primary norm. 
Of course, it is a distinct question whether an actor should nevertheless be liable 
if he thinks his conduct creates a substantial risk of death even though a reasonable 
person would not share that belief, or if he thinks that the victim is not consenting even 
though a reasonable person would believe that she is. 
97 I say “little” rather than “none” because it is possible that some of the other functions of 
negligence would still be served in such a world.  While all probabilities of injury and 
benefit would now be 0 or 1, the relative valuation of the harms and benefits might, within 
some range, be left to the normative judgment of a trier of fact applying a 
“reasonableness” standard.  For example, although the law of this hypothetical world 
would undoubtedly include a clear rule about the permissibility of intentionally killing one 
innocent to save another, it might not include a rule about the permissibility of a driver, in 
an emergency, ruining someone’s rose bushes in order to avoid running his car into a 
Page 43 of 57 Simons, Dimensions of Negligence  8/7/02 
• Don’t kill a pedestrian unless this is absolutely necessary to save the lives 
of several persons being rushed to the hospital. 
 
• Don’t accelerate the death of a patient through a medical procedure 
unless the procedure is designed to relieve his unbearable pain. 
 
• Don’t kill a person in self-defense unless he would otherwise cause your 
death or permanent and severe disability. 
 
In our actual world, however, both the risks and benefits of actions are 
highly uncertain.  A negligence standard recognizes the difficulty of such 
predictions; permits lower-risk actions to be justified much more readily than 
higher-risk actions; and permits a factfinder to consider the qualitative as well as 
quantitative aspects of risk analysis.98  For these and other reasons, the 
derivative character of the negligence standard does not mean that negligence 
analysis is a simple, mechanical extrapolation from the primary norm.  (One 
cannot, for example, simply define negligent homicide as a killing in which the 
actor should have realized that he created a 2%, or 5%, risk of unjustifiably 
causing a death.)  Indeed, it is fair to say that most of the difficult and interesting 
questions in negligence law do not turn on which harms would be unjustifiable to 
cause if we knew for certain that they would ensue.  Rather, they turn on when 
one might justifiably create a low-level risk of harm even though it is quite clear 
that creating a virtually certain risk of the harm would be unjustifiable. 
 Understanding negligence as a derivative concept also helps explain why 
it is so extraordinarily difficult to develop a “formula” for negligence that seems 
adequate to capture all relevant considerations.  For negligence is simply the 
“low-risk” version of all moral and legal norms; yet these norms themselves are 
numerous and cannot possibly be encapsulated by any single formula.99  Thus, 
                                                                                                                                                 
curb and suffering a flat tire.  Although one harm or the other will inevitably occur, the 
relative value of the two harms might still be determined under a general 
“reasonableness” standard.  
98 Thus, negligence analysis can: (a) consider such qualitative risk factors as whether the 
risk was voluntarily incurred, see Simons, Negligence, supra note 1=, at 71; (b) “launder” 
or ignore socially objectionable preferences, id. at 73-74; and (c) consider fair distribution 
of risks, as well as their minimization, id. at 82. 
99 See Simons, Negligence, supra note 1=, at 61-66; Simons, The Hand Formula, supra 
note 1=, at 928-929. 
Page 44 of 57 Simons, Dimensions of Negligence  8/7/02 
viewed as a moral concept, negligence is continuous with the rest of action-
guiding morality, including the moral rules that would apply if we were certain 
what consequences our actions would bring.  If it is categorically wrong to kill one 
innocent person to save six, then it is probably wrong to create a 50% risk of 
death to one in order to save three.  If it is permissible to turn a trolley and kill 
three to save four, then it is probably permissible to turn a trolley if this creates a 
10% risk of death to three but avoids a 10% risk to four.100  Yet moral norms, 
including the norms that are embodied in law, are plural and complex.  We 
should thus hardly expect that a single legal norm of negligence will easily 
capture this plurality—especially since the “low-risk” version of these norms will 
typically impose a weaker constraint, i.e., low-risk conduct is normally easier to 
justify than higher-risk conduct). 
 Because negligence can function as a derivative norm of “risk-creation” 
(loosely speaking), it is conceptually possible to impose liability for risk-creation 
alone, even if it does not issue in the ultimate, primary harm.  To some extent, 
the law does so.  The Model Penal Code recognizes a crime of reckless 
endangerment.101  Other examples include such traffic offenses as speeding, 
driving while intoxicated, or negligent operation of a motor vehicle.  Moreover, 
many statutory inchoate offenses, while not formally defined in terms of risk-
creation or negligence, are in substance derivative legal norms, since the reason 
for punishing the relevant conduct is to avoid a more serious, primary harm.  
Burglary and possession offenses are good examples.102  Attempts are another, 
though they typically involve a much higher degree of risk, or a more culpable 
state of mind, than negligence.103  In short, legal norms of negligent risk-creation 
                                                 
100 The continuity is not entirely smooth, however.  If a driver speeds to the hospital in 
order to save five passengers from imminent death and thereby creates an almost certain 
risk of killing a pedestrian, his action is clearly impermissible.  But it is not so clearly 
impermissible for such a driver to create a 20% risk of killing a pedestrian in order to save 
one passenger.  See Simons, Negligence, supra note 1=, at 65. 
101 MPC § 211.2. 
102 See generally Douglas Husak, The Nature and Justifiability of Nonconsummate 
Offenses, 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 151 (1995). 
103 Attempted murder, for example, is a crime parasitic on the primary wrong of 
committing an unjustified killing.  There is nothing wrong with trying to kill someone, 
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(or negligent ignorance or mistake), insofar as they are parasitic on primary legal 
norms, actually share this characteristic with a much broader category of 
inchoate crimes.  Still, it is sensible to identify the parasitic function of negligence 
as a distinctive characteristic of the negligence concept, for negligence is almost 
always defined by reference to a primary harm. 
 
E. Distinguish grades of fault 
 
Last but not least, a negligence criterion very often performs the function 
of distinguishing grades of fault.  A legal system might only recognize one grade 
of fault, but often it recognizes some categories of strict as well as fault liability, 
or it recognizes numerous categories of fault.  This section will explore three 
features of this grading function. 
First,  consider the distinction between negligence and strict liability.  A 
negligence standard might be employed as a necessary condition for legal 
liability, whether in tort, criminal law, or another area of law.  Strict liability would 
then be excluded.104  The American legal system is not this firmly committed to a 
fault perspective.  However, American tort law does treat negligence as normally 
sufficient for legal liability, at least with respect to physical harms; by contrast, it 
views strict liability as somewhat exceptional, and limited to a set of particular 
rules.105 
                                                                                                                                                 
except—and it’s a rather significant “exception”!—that one might well succeed.  See Heidi 
Hurd, What in the World is Wrong?, 5 J. Crim. L. & Criminol. 157, 193-195 (1994). 
104 In Canada, strict criminal liability violates the national constitution if imprisonment is 
authorized for the crime.  Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) S 94(2), 2 S. 
C. R. 486 (1985). 
105 See Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts, Ch. 4, Scope Note, p. 291. 
Moreover, even when strict liability is recognized as a possible basis of liability, a 
negligence standard performs the important function of differentiating fault from non-fault.  
Just where this distinction is drawn can be significant.  In criminal law, the penalties for 
negligence might exceed those for strict liability.  In tort law, although characterizing an 
actor’s tort as involving fault rather than strict liability does not, by itself, affect the size of 
the compensatory damage award, it has some doctrinal consequences—for example, it 
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The border between negligence and strict liability is hotly contested.  In 
products liability, for example, much ink has been spilled over the question of 
what types of product “defects” should incur liability, and much of the debate is 
about whether, and in what sense, defectiveness should depend on a showing of 
fault.  More subtly, one might question whether certain aspects of the negligence 
standard itself are genuinely “fault”-based.  Thus, the objective “reasonable 
person” test for adults ignores whether they lack ordinary capacities of 
intelligence and mental competence, in apparent violation of the maxim that 
“ought implies can.”  Also, the reasonable person test, as actually employed, 
probably requires a superhuman ability to act with due care on all occasions 
(e.g., requiring a driver’s attention never to waver), again suggesting that a 
pocket of strict liability exists within the nominal domain of fault-based negligence 
liability.106 
 
Second, a negligence standard is conventionally the least culpable or 
serious form of genuine fault in any liability system that recognizes multiple 
degrees or types of fault.  Establishing a hierarchy of fault or culpability is 
especially important in the criminal law, given the desirability of imposing 
punishments proportional to culpability. 
But if proportionality of this sort is to be achieved, it is critical to identify 
the relevant conception or conceptions of negligence to which more serious 
types of fault are to be compared.  And here, the conventional Model Penal Code 
hierarchy leaves much to be desired.107  That hierarchy, you will recall, considers 
the following forms of culpability increasingly serious: strict liability; negligence; 
recklessness; knowledge (i.e., awareness that a result is practically certain to 
occur or that a circumstance is highly probable); and purpose.  
                                                                                                                                                 
may increase the faulty actor’s comparative share of responsibility.  See Restatement 
(Third) of Torts, Apportionment of Liability, §8. 
106 See Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts, §3, comment k. 
107 For a thorough exploration of this point, see Simons, Rethinking Mental States, supra 
note 9=. 
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Consider the following paradoxical example, illustrating the inadequacy of 
the conventional hierarchy.  Suppose “negligent driving” is a crime.108  A 
negligent driver might be less culpable than a reckless driver, insofar as the latter 
but not the former is aware of the substantial risks posed by his manner of 
driving.  So far so good.  But now compare someone who “knowingly” or 
“purposely” drives.  Although these culpability terms rank higher in the 
conventional hierarchy than negligence or recklessness, a knowing or purposeful 
actor is obviously less, not more, deserving of punishment than a negligent or 
reckless driver.  After all, knowing that one is driving imports no culpability at all. 
Why might negligent and reckless drivers (who are supposedly lower on 
the culpability hierarchy) deserve some criminal punishment, while a knowing 
driver clearly does not?  Because “driving” can be restated as “causing the 
operation of a motor vehicle”; and negligence and recklessness, when applied to 
such a result, both embody an evaluative judgment, all things considered, that 
one should not drive in that manner.  Both forms of culpability entail lack of 
justification.  But knowledge and purpose are different in these respects: both are 
descriptive, not evaluative, culpability terms, and neither entails lack of 
justification.109 
                                                 
108 The analysis above considered “result” and “circumstance” elements of a crime.  The 
crime of “negligent driving” implicates a third type of offense element recognized by the 
MPC—namely, a “conduct” element.  Other examples are “breaking and entering” in the 
crime of burglary, or “exceeding the speed limit” in the crime of speeding.  Such elements 
are probably best analyzed in the same manner as explicit result elements (or, 
sometimes, as circumstance elements).  Implicitly, “conduct” elements require an actor to 
perform some basic act or acts and thereby engage in, or cause, the statutorily defined 
“conduct.”  Consider “negligent driving.”  If you enter a car, turn the ignition, and press the 
accelerator, you will be “driving” the car.  More precisely, we might say that your “driving” 
is the result of your basic acts, i.e., that “driving” requires you to perform basic acts that in 
turn cause the operation of a motor vehicle.  See Michael Moore, Act and Crime: The 
Philosophy of Action and Its Implications for Criminal Law, Ch. 8 (1993). 
109 Contrast a crime of speeding, defined as “operating a vehicle in excess of the speed 
limit.”  Here, with respect to the element “in excess of the speed limit,” the MPC hierarchy 
more plausibly applies.  One who purposely or knowingly exceeds the speed limit is 
ordinarily more culpable than one who recklessly or negligently does so.  (Again, 
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The crime of homicide also exhibits these differences, but much less 
dramatically.  Negligent and reckless killings are, by definition, unjustified acts; 
the inquiry into justification precedes the finding of fault.  By contrast, knowing 
and purposeful killings might or might not be justified, depending on whether 
such defenses as self-defense or lesser evils apply.  The “knowing driving” 
example is more striking than “knowing killing,” however, because driving is not a 
prima facie unjustifiable act, as killing is.  Obviously, bringing about the death of 
another is an act that demands a strong justification.  If one knowingly or 
purposely brings about that result, then the burden of production or proof on 
justification might shift to the actor, and available justifications themselves will be 
limited in scope.  But if one knows only that one has created a low-level risk of 
bringing about the result (i.e., one is “reckless” in the Model Penal Code sense), 
or if one merely should be aware of such a risk, then it makes some sense not to 
shift the burden of proof and not to limit unduly the scope of possible 
justifications. 
These examples illustrate that it is a mistake directly to compare 
culpability categories when some include lack of justification as part of their 
definition but others do not.  The solution?  A careful ceteris paribus approach.  
But that, in turn, requires carefully distinguishing the different types of negligence 
and fault, so that the hierarchy of fault directly compares only those categories of 
fault that are genuinely comparable. 
Thus, any hierarchy of culpability categories that employs negligence as 
one category must carefully identify which conception of negligence it has in 
mind.  When cognitive negligence is the relevant meaning, then the Model Penal 
Code hierarchy usually work well.  Holding everything else constant, one can 
directly compare an actor who should be (but is not) aware that a victim is not 
consenting, with one who recklessly suspects that she might not consent—and, 
further “up” the hierarchy, with one who knows that she does not consent., and 
finally, with one who hopes that she does not.110 
                                                                                                                                                 
however, the knowing or purposeful actor might have a defense of justification, while the 
reckless or negligent actor is necessarily unjustified.) 
110 Even higher up the hierarchy is the actor who “hopes” that the victim does not 
consent.  In MPC terminology, such an actor is purposeful but not knowing as to that 
circumstance element.  MPC, §2.02(2)(a) & (b).  It is doubtful, however, that the conative 
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However, when conduct negligence is the relevant meaning, then the 
hierarchy sometimes fails to work, as we have seen in the “negligent v. knowing 
driving” example.  Part of the difficulty is this: if the legal norm specifies a type of 
conduct (such as “operating a motor vehicle”) that is not presumptively 
unjustifiable, then even if we require that the specified conduct occur “knowingly” 
or “purposely,” these descriptive culpability terms do not change the status of the 
conduct.  By themselves, they do not transform morally neutral conduct into 
conduct that presumptively needs justification. 
On the other hand, conduct negligence can more readily be employed 
within a defensible hierarchy of fault if the hierarchy focuses on the degree of 
unjustifiability of the conduct, not on the actor’s beliefs or intentions.  Thus, in tort 
law, the distinction between ordinary and gross negligence is perfectly 
defensible, insofar as the latter represents a more serious departure from the 
standard of due care or from the conduct that a reasonable person in the 
circumstances would observe.111 
 The Model Penal Code, by combining cognitive and conduct negligence, 
inevitably makes it doubtful that any single hierarchy of fault will suffice.112 In 
principle, the best approach would be to disentangle the distinct features 
embedded within “negligence” and “recklessness” as those culpability terms are 
                                                                                                                                                 
mental state of hope should invariably be ranked as more serious than the cognitive state 
of belief.  See Simons, Rethinking Mental States, supra note 9=. 
Moreover, even if we limit our attention to cognitive states, the single hierarchy is 
problematic.  See note 82= supra (describing situations in which cognitive negligence can 
be as culpable as recklessness); Husak, The Sequential Principle of Relative Culpability, 
supra note 17=, at 508. 
111 See Keeton, Dobbs, Keeton & Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 211-
212 (5th ed. 1984); Dobbs, supra note 5=, at 349-352.  Note that the Learned Hand 
formulation of negligence makes it relatively easy to conceptualize gross negligence—as 
a case in which the burden of taking a precaution is much less than the risk-reduction 
benefits of taking a precaution. 
112 Indeed, I have endorsed a tripartite hierarchy, with separate hierarchies of belief 
(embracing knowledge, the cognitive dimension of MPC recklessness, and cognitive 
negligence), desire (embracing intention and the “culpable indifference” sense of 
recklessness), and conduct (embracing gross negligence and ordinary negligence).  See 
Simons, Rethinking Mental States, supra note 9=. 
Page 50 of 57 Simons, Dimensions of Negligence  8/7/02 
often used.  If negligence is meant to convey both conduct and cognitive 
negligence, it is worthwhile to separate these out.  Similarly for recklessness, 
which is often intended to convey both conduct negligence and awareness of a 
risk. 
Similar difficulties undermine any contention that American tort law 
reflects a unified hierarchy of fault.  American tort law does not contain the 
multiplicity of grading distinctions that characterize American criminal law.  But it 
does broadly differentiate three kinds of torts—intentional, negligence, and strict 
liability.  This differentiation creates the appearance of a single, very general 
hierarchy of fault.  Unfortunately, the appearance is an illusion.  Thus, with 
respect to causation of physical harm, it is tempting to assume that the 
intentional tort of battery identifies the most serious form of fault, knowingly or 
purposely causing physical harm, while negligence identifies a less serious 
form.113  And the Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts contains language to this 
effect.114  Yet the type of intentional “harm” that the tort of battery protects against 
is not the intentional infliction of physical harm, or even offense, to another.  
Rather, battery protects against the nonconsensual intentional interference with 
the victim’s bodily integrity, i.e. against nonconsensual intentional “touchings.”115  
(This explains, for example, why a medical operation beyond the scope of the 
actor’s consent is a battery.  In such a case, the doctor can be liable without any 
                                                 
113 Tort “recklessness” is an intermediate category.  Relative to negligence, it requires 
that the conduct be more clearly unjustifiable, and it requires awareness either of the risk 
or of the facts that should make the risk obvious.  See Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts, 
§2. 
114 Thus, §5 provides: “An actor who intentionally causes physical harm is subject to 
liability for that harm”; and comment a states that this rule “provides a framework that 
encompasses many of the specific torts described in much more detail in the 
Restatement Second of Torts,” including harmful battery.  This suggests, misleadingly, 
that battery requires an intent to cause physical harm, rather than an intent to cause 
contact that, as it turns out, is harmful. 
115 See Dobbs, supra note 5=, at 52-53.  Although “harmful” batteries require physical 
harm, the harm need not be intended or known to be a likely consequence of the 
touching.  And, of course, merely “offensive” batteries are also recognized.  Id. at 53. 
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intent to cause harm or offense.116)  Accordingly, the object of the intentional tort 
of battery is different from the object of the general tort of negligence, and the 
torts are not directly comparable.  Granted, tort law sometimes treats intentional 
risk-creation or causation of harm more seriously than negligent risk-creation or 
causation of harm.117  But too often the tort hierarchy of fault is articulated in a 
way that compares apples and oranges, in which case the hierarchy is 
unpersuasive.  
 
A third and last variation of the grading function of the negligence 
standard deserves particular note: the use of negligence to increase the grade of 
a legal wrong.  I have been assuming that the negligence in question marks a 
distinction between fault liability and strict (or no) liability.  Yet sometimes, and in 
criminal law especially, negligence differentiates lesser and greater wrongs.  
Thus, negligent homicide is a crime, while non-negligent causation of death is 
not.  But if assault on a police officer is a more serious crime than simple assault, 
and if negligence as to the victim’s status as a police officer is the culpability 
required for guilt of the more serious offense, then negligence performs this third 
function.118 
When negligence performs this grade-increasing function, the meaning of 
“negligence” should again be sensitive to the context.  The question is not simply 
whether, in the abstract, the person committing the assault should have realized 
that his victim was a police officer.  Rather, the more seriously the law views the 
circumstance in question, and the more obvious the risk should be in light of the 
other offense elements that the actor must satisfy, the more readily one can 
criticize the actor’s cognitive negligence in failing to appreciate the incriminating 
circumstance.  And, by way of contrast, whether a passive bystander to the 
assault who is paying little attention to the affray “should have realized” that one 
                                                 
116 See Mohr v. Williams, 105 N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905). 
117 See note 2, supra. 
118 For example, under Virginia law, simple assault is a Class 1 misdemeanor, while 
assault of a police officer is a Class 6 felony; and conviction of the latter requires that the 
actor know or have reason to know that the victim was a police officer.  Va. Code Ann. 
§18.2-57 (A), (C) (2001). 
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of the participants was a police officer is a completely different question.  (It is not 
clear that the bystander deserves even moral blame.) 
But the context is also relevant in a special way when negligence is 
employed to increase the grade of an offense.  For the very fact that the actor 
has committed a lesser crime affects the justifiability of his taking risks of 
committing an even greater crime.  A prominent example here is the crime of 
felony murder.  If an actor commits an inherently dangerous felony and thereby 
accidentally causes a death, he is often treated as harshly as one who intends to 
cause a death.  (Suppose X and Y, who is carrying a loaded gun, rob V; if the 
gun accidentally discharges, killing a bystander, both X and Y might be liable for 
felony-murder.)  Although the traditional felony murder doctrine is, I believe, 
much too harsh, a modest version of the doctrine is defensible.  Specifically, an 
actor who commits a dangerous felony, and who is also negligent as to the risk of 
death arising from such a felony,119 may justifiably be treated as harshly as a 
different actor who has not committed a felony but recklessly causes a death,120 
and more harshly than a third actor who has not committed a felony but 
negligently causes a death.  The rationale is that the underlying conduct that led 
to a death—commission of a serious felony—is both dangerous and seriously 
culpable.121  An alternative approach that analyzes the question of “negligence as 
                                                 
119 Some jurisdictions applying the felony-murder rule explicitly require negligence as to 
the resulting death.  Most do not, however.  See Guyora Binder, Felony Murder and 
Mens Rea Default Rules: A Study in Statutory Interpretation, 4 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 399 
(2000). 
Moreover, if the jurisdiction specifies that the underlying felony, or the 
circumstances under which it is committed, must be dangerous, and if the definition of 
dangerousness is narrow and clear enough, then that alone might suffice to demonstrate 
the actor’s negligence as to resulting death, and an explicit negligence culpability 
requirement might be unnecessary. 
120 Paul Robinson and John Darley, in their interesting study of popular views about 
deserved punishment, find that those surveyed would endorse a “felony-manslaughter” 
rule in place of a “felony-murder” rule.  That is, survey participants believe that when 
death occurs in the course of a felony, the felon deserves a level of punishment 
corresponding to reckless manslaughter, not to knowing or intentional murder.  Paul 
Robinson & John Darley, Justice, Liability and Blame 169-181 (Oxford 1995). 
121 See Simons, Strict Liability, supra note 36=, at 1121-1125. 
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to death” in isolation from this context arguably fails to impose a sanction that is 
proportional to the seriousness of the felon’s acts and culpability.122 
 
VII.  Conclusion 
 
Conduct and cognitive negligence, I have suggested, are fundamentally 
distinct conceptions.  What an actor should do is a different inquiry from what an 
actor should believe.  At the same time, the conceptions are often employed in 
conjunction, especially in criminal law; and the conduct conception ordinarily 
does presuppose reasonable foresight of risk, which is a cognitive concept. 
Moreover, legal standards explicitly or implicitly recognize other types of 
negligence as well—for example, deficient self-control. 
This essay also identifies five significant institutional functions served by a 
legal negligence standard.  These functions reveal the distinctive significance of 
negligence, but also disclose some problems that the use of such a legal 
standard can pose. 
The analysis of these different dimensions of negligence clarifies certain 
misconceptions, and has some important implications: 
• The question whether “negligence” is an appropriate minimum standard 
of liability (e.g., for criminal punishment) is ill-formed.  One cannot 
analyze the desirability of “negligence liability” in the abstract without 
considering its type (conduct or cognitive) or its role in norm-definition (as 
                                                 
122 A similar issue arises in determining how mistakes as to justification should be graded.  
The Model Penal Code adopts an “equivalence” approach, whereby an actor who makes 
a negligent mistake in assessing the need to use deadly force is guilty only of negligent 
homicide, while the actor who makes a reckless mistake is guilty of reckless homicide.  
MPC, §3.09(2).  Whether this approach is sound is an open question.  Some would view 
a negligent mistake in the context of knowingly and intentionally using deadly force 
against another (a mistake relevant to justification) as more seriously culpable than a 
negligent mistake about whether a driving maneuver will cause another’s death (a 
mistake relevant to the prima facie case).  The Code’s equivalence approach might, in 
the end, be defensible, but it does need normative defense.  Not all negligent mistakes 
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a general standard of liability for harm-creation, or instead as an 
interstitial standard applying only to some elements of a crime or wrong). 
• Negligence is more pervasively employed in the law than one might 
realize.  It sometimes take the form of an inchoate crime of risk-creation.  
And it sometimes takes the form of a relatively clear and predefined rule. 
• Comparing negligence to supposedly “more serious” forms of fault, such 
as recklessness, knowledge, and purpose, is treacherous.  Depending on 
the type of negligence, as well as the type of recklessness or other fault, 
this might amount to comparing apples and oranges. 
• Defining negligence in purely cognitive terms (i.e., simply as 
unreasonable failure to be aware of a risk) is often inadequate, for the 
legal norm often also demands that the actor has created an 
unreasonable risk or has failed to take a reasonable precaution. 
• Negligence need not be understood as failing to exercise the care that a 
“reasonable person” would exercise. 
• Negligence ordinarily identifies a type of fault that is derivative of a 
primary wrong or harm. 
 
Finally, although this paper has not focused on the different possible 
normative rationales for negligence liability, I offer a few thoughts about the 
relation between such rationales and the dimensions of negligence that the paper 
more directly addresses. 
First, there is no direct relationship between the normative rationale for 
negligence liability and the choice of a cognitive or conduct conception of 
negligence.  Under an economic and deterrent rationale, for example, a cognitive 
test might be useful in calibrating the actor’s amenability to deterrence, but a 
fairness rationale might also employ a cognitive test, as reflecting the actor’s 
degree of fault or culpability.123  Of course, the precise formulation and content of 
any negligence test (e.g., whether it is defined in terms of costs and benefits or in 
                                                                                                                                                 
are necessarily the same; the context of a negligent mistake can be critically important to 
deciding what degree of culpability the mistake exhibits. 
123 For further thoughts along these lines, see Simons, Rethinking Mental States, supra 
note 9=, at 495-515. 
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terms of the reasonable person in the community) will reflect its normative 
underpinnings. 
Second, the five different functions of legal negligence standards 
discussed above are also not directly dependent on the normative rationale for 
negligence liability.  Still, some relationships do exist between the rationale and 
certain of those functions. 
An economic approach is likely to emphasize deterrence of negligent 
behavior.  Accordingly, advocates of this approach will be concerned about the 
inefficiency and imprecision of standards relative to rules, and about the 
unpredictability of a legal negligence standard if a trier of fact has the largely 
unreviewable power to define its content.  On the other hand, a broader utilitarian 
approach might give significant weight to the norm-reinforcement achieved when 
the community expresses its disapproval of faulty conduct, even if that 
disapproval is conveyed in vague “unreasonableness” terms. 
From a corrective or retributive justice perspective, the standard-like 
articulation of negligence might better express the meaning of fault; and, on 
many accounts, it is fault that justifies a tortfeasor’s duty of repair to a wronged 
victim as well as the state’s right (or duty) to punish a wrongdoer. 
The choice of normative rationale seems to bear only a slight relationship 
to the desirability of negligence’s personification function.  This is so whether the 
point of this function is merely rhetorical, or instead is to explain that deficient skill 
can be negligent, or to facilitate individualization, or to rationalize excuse. 
Finally, the last two functions—creating a secondary legal norm parasitic 
on a primary one, and distinguishing grades of fault—again do not seem to 
depend directly on the choice of normative justification.  Of course, the precise 
ways in which fault is actually defined, graded and sanctioned clearly will and 
should depend on the underlying normative rationale.  Thus, with respect to the 
types of inchoate risk-creation that should give rise to legal liability, we might 
conclude that a largely undeterrable but very dangerous individual deserves 
significant punishment under a retributive rationale but not under a utilitarian one. 
* * * 
The dimensions of negligence are many.  A better understanding of the 
difference between conduct and cognitive negligence, and of the distinctive 
institutional functions of a legal negligence standard, should facilitate the 
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development of more coherent, and more justifiable, fault criteria in criminal law, 
torts, and other legal domains. 
